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LET’S TALK ABOUT TAX: FIXING BANK
INCENTIVES TO SABOTAGE STABILITY
Hilary J. Allen*
Regulatory capital requirements are in place to improve bank (and
systemic) stability by forcing banks to fund themselves with more
loss-absorbent equity. But banks have strong incentives to prefer
debt funding to equity funding, and thus to arbitrage regulatory
capital requirements. In particular, banks have (often successfully)
petitioned regulators to allow them to satisfy regulatory capital
requirements with hybrid debt-equity instruments that can be treated
as debt for tax purposes. Unfortunately, the financial crisis showed
that the first generation of these hybrid instruments, including trust
preferred securities, did not live up to their promise of promoting
bank stability. The next generation of hybrids, the contingent
convertible bonds or “cocos,” have the potential to be downright
harmful to stability.
We therefore need to address bank incentives to create hybrid
instruments, and otherwise arbitrage regulatory capital requirements.
While regulatory capital requirements are almost always discussed in
isolation from tax policy, this Article recognizes that banks’
reluctance to fund themselves with larger cushions of common
equity is, in large part, a tax problem. Financial regulators, rather
than accepting such tax preferences as a given, should engage with
their tax colleagues and revisit the wisdom of tax policies that
incentivize reliance on debt funding, and the instability such reliance
creates. To that end, this Article takes the first step in fusing
together regulatory capital scholarship with the tax literature on
reducing debt bias, and proposes that common equity held by banks
as regulatory capital should be made tax deductible.

* Assistant Professor, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law. Many thanks to
Chris Brummer, Vic Fleischer, Bob Hockett and James Kwak for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also go to participants in the Brooklyn Law School
Workshop on Financial Regulation for their input.
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INTRODUCTION
For many non-tax lawyers, the complexity of tax law makes it a
subject approached with trepidation and awe: tax is shrouded in a
mystique that makes non-experts wary of intruding.1 But understanding
tax law is fundamentally important to the regulation of banks, because
tax law creates strong incentives for banks to fund themselves with debt

1. Commenting on the complexity of tax law, LoPucki noted that “the tradeoff for
that complexity is that the expert community is fully absorbed with it and has less time
to devote to understanding how the law they have mastered relates to the rest of the
world. Additionally, legal expertise that goes beyond a certain level of complexity is of
little use, because it cannot be communicated to others, which ordinarily is a
prerequisite to application.” Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the
Law in Lawyers’ Heads, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1498, 1542 (1996).
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rather than equity, 2 and banks with insufficient equity funding are
inherently unstable due to their limited ability to absorb losses.3 It is
therefore vital that financial regulatory scholars and policymakers
engage with tax law to address these tax-driven incentives for
instability. Unfortunately, perhaps because of the perception of tax law
as a segregated and impenetrable discipline,4 this has rarely happened.5
The key contribution of this Article, then, is to recognize the
interdependent nature of regulatory capital and taxation policies, and
spur a conversation between the disciplines.6
In particular, this Article seeks to push the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (the preeminent international standard setter for
bank regulation)7 to consider tax issues. To date, the BCBS has not
directly confronted the tax-driven bias towards debt financing.8 Instead,
2. Ilan Benshalom, How to Live With A Tax Code With Which You Disagree:
Doctrine, Optimal Tax, Common Sense, and the Debt-Equity Distinction, 88 N.C. L.
REV. 1217, 1221 (2010).
3. See infra Part I.B.
4. Gilson and Schizer comment that “tax ‘practice’ [is] the plumbing of tax law
that is familiar to practitioners but, predictably, is opaque to those, including financial
economists, outside the day-to-day tax practice.” Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer,
Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred
Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 877 (2003).
5. Viral Acharya and his colleagues have commented that “[t]he fact that neither
the Dodd-Frank Act nor Basel III tries to investigate the question of why equity
financing is more costly than debt financing is rather disappointing.” Viral V. Acharya,
Nirupama Kulkarni & Matthew Richardson, Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity
Requirements, in REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW
ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 143, 157 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011).
6. Although accounting issues are not covered in any detail in this Article,
accountants also have an important role to play in this conversation.
7. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision or “BCBS” is an international
standard-setting body comprised of representatives from twenty-seven different
countries. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm (last visited June 15, 2013). Because
the IMF and the World Bank often require countries to comply with the BCBS’s
standards as a condition of receiving assistance (and still more countries have chosen to
comply with the BCBS’s standards as best practices, or to provide comfort to foreign
investors), standards promulgated by the BCBS apply to many more countries than its
twenty-seven members. See KERN ALEXANDER, RAHUL DHUMALE, & JOHN EATWELL,
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
SYSTEMIC RISK 39 (2006). This raises legitimacy issues, which are discussed in more
detail in notes 356–58, infra, and accompanying text.
8. The underlying tax incentives for higher bank leverage are not even mentioned
in Basel I, II or III. Basel I goes so far as to say that “tax considerations are not
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it seems content to view this bias as inevitable and has created a “workaround” by implementing rules that require a minimum percentage of
bank funding to be comprised of equity and equity-like instruments
rather than debt 9 —these rules are known as regulatory capital
requirements.10 We are thus left with something of a policy paradox:
financial regulation forces banks to fund themselves with more equity,
while tax rules simultaneously punish equity funding.11
addressed in this paper.” BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 3 (1988),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf [hereinafter BASEL I].
9. Shackelford et al. have noted that, traditionally, “academics and policymakers
have given far less attention to the possible role of tax instruments in the financial . . .
realm, reflecting direct regulation’s predominant role in addressing financial sector
issues.” Douglas A. Shackelford, Daniel N. Shaviro, & Joel Slemrod, Taxation and the
Financial Sector, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 781, 782 (2010).
10. The BCBS has promulgated three major standards that are colloquially known
as Basel I, Basel II, and Basel III. Formally speaking, Basel I is a document titled
“International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards,” that was
published by the BCBS in July of 1988. Basel I (like the subsequent Basel II and III
standards) was not binding on individual nations, but each of the then G-10 nations
committed to implement Basel I into national law by the end of 1992. See BASEL I,
supra note 8, at 14. As Basel I became outmoded, the BCBS issued new standards. See
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL II: INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (2004),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf [hereinafter BASEL II]. This is
colloquially known as Basel II, and it was intended to be phased in from 2006 through
2009. However, even before the implementation was complete, the Financial Crisis
showed the regulatory capital requirements of Basel I and II to be inadequate. The
BCBS responded with a compilation of documents that have come to be known as
Basel III. The key document setting out regulatory capital requirements under Basel III
was released on December 16, 2010 and is entitled “Basel III: A global regulatory
framework for more resilient banks and banking systems.” BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT
BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ
/bcbs189.pdf [hereinafter BASEL III].
11. The paradoxical nature of policy with respect to regulatory capital was
highlighted in a comment letter written to the Financial Times by twenty prominent
economists. They noted that “[i]t is paradoxical to subsidize debt that generates
systemic risk and then regulate to try to limit debt.” Anat Admati et al., Healthy
Banking System Is the Goal, Not Profitable Banks, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010,
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/packages/pdf/admatiFTletter11.09.10.pdf.
The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also noted that “[b]anks face both an explicit
tax advantage of debt and, through regulatory requirements, an implicit penalty— with
evident risk of policy incoherence.” INT’L MONETARY FUND, DEBT BIAS AND OTHER
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In what appears to be a subconscious attempt to reconcile these
inconsistent tax and financial regulatory positions, the BCBS has
expended considerable effort to allow banks to satisfy at least some of
their regulatory capital requirements with hybrid debt-equity
instruments. 12 These hybrids have some of the loss-absorbing
characteristics of equity, but also possess a sufficient number of debtlike attributes to justify their being treated as debt instruments for the
purposes of tax-deductibility.13 However, by allowing hybrids to count
as regulatory capital, the BCBS is promoting the creation of new and
complex financial instruments that can compromise bank and financial
system stability.14 Furthermore, the allocation of resources to devising
these hybrid instruments can be viewed as socially wasteful, because the
instruments have little use other than to arbitrage regulatory capital
requirements.15
A simpler solution is preferable: 16 this Article takes the position
that tax penalties for equity funding are not immutable, and that by
addressing these tax penalties directly, we can obviate much of the
desire of banks to satisfy their regulatory capital requirements with
inferior and complicated hybrid instruments.
To provide some
background for this discussion, Part I of this Article will briefly
summarize the regulatory capital standards (known colloquially as Basel
I, Basel II and Basel III)17 that the BCBS has promulgated over the years

DISTORTIONS: CRISIS-RELATED ISSUES IN TAX POLICY 11 (2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/061209.pdf.
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. See Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 168.
14. See Tax Reform and the Tax Treatment of Debt and Equity: Joint Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means & the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. 9
(2011) (statement of Victor Fleischer, Professor, University of Colorado Law School)
[hereinafter Fleischer], available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Fleischer%20Testimony.pdf; Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability
Regulation 37–39 (Feb. 20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2085336.
15. See Benshalom, supra note 2, at 1233–34; see also Fleischer, supra note 14, at
20.
16. “In complex environments, decision rules based on one, or a few, good reasons
can trump sophisticated alternatives. Less may be more.” Andrew G. Haldane,
Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England, & Vasileios Madouros,
Economist, Bank of England, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Symposium: The Changing Policy Landscape, The Dog and the Frisbee 5 (Aug. 31,
2012), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r120905a.pdf?frames=0.
17. See supra notes 8, 10.
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in an attempt to require banks to fund themselves with more equity. Part
I goes on to consider in detail the reasons why banks seek to arbitrage
these regulatory capital requirements, concluding that minimal equity
funding becomes privately optimal for individual banks (although it is
suboptimal for society at large) because of tax and other government
subsidies that favor debt.18
Using debt-equity hybrid instruments to satisfy regulatory capital
requirements is one way in which banks can maximize their debt
funding. Basel I and II sanctioned this practice,19 but the experience of
the financial crisis20 showed that many of these hybrid instruments did
not absorb losses as well as expected,21 and were thus inferior substitutes
for regulatory capital in the form of common shares and retained
earnings—the best form of capital, which the BCBS calls “Common
Equity Tier 1.” 22 To illustrate the problems associated with earlier
versions of hybrid instruments, Part II.A will consider the case study of
trust-preferred securities (“TruPSs”), which were very popular in the
United States until the financial crisis revealed their inadequacies as
regulatory capital. While instruments like TruPSs no longer qualify as
regulatory capital under the most recent Basel III standards,23 Basel III
does allow banks to use a “next-generation” of hybrid instruments to
satisfy some of their regulatory capital requirements, so long as these
hybrids satisfy certain loss-absorbency criteria.24 Part II.B considers the
most prominent of these next-generation hybrids: the contingent
convertible capital instrument, or “coco.”
Although there have been few issuances of cocos to date, these
hybrid instruments have been feted for their purported recapitalization
and governance benefits. However, a detailed examination of these
18. Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion
of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive 4, 39 (Rock Ctr. for Corp.
Governance at Stanford Univ., Paper No. 86, 2011), available at
https://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP2065R1&86.pdf.
19. See infra Part I.A.
20. The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 will be referred to in this Article as the
“Financial Crisis.”
21. Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Basel Committee Issues Final
Elements of the Reforms to Raise the Quality of Regulatory Capital (Jan. 13, 2011),
available at http://www.bis.org/press/p110113.pdf.
22. BASEL III, supra note 10, at 13.
23. This is because TruPSs cannot be written off or converted into common equity,
as required. See Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, supra note 21.
24. Id.
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cocos indicates that such benefits are limited at best, and are far
outweighed by the systemic risks involved. 25 It therefore comes as
somewhat of a relief that regulators in the United States have recently
declined to endorse the use of these instruments as regulatory capital.26
However, cocos have received a lot of support from authorities in
Europe, 27 and there was strong international demand for a recent
issuance of cocos by the British bank Barclays. 28 Given the global
nature of the financial system, if cocos were to destabilize banks in
Europe, the impact would certainly be felt around the world.29 To avoid
this outcome, this Article argues that the BCBS should refine its
international regulatory capital standards to reject cocos and mandate
that regulatory capital requirements be satisfied entirely with vanilla,
uncomplicated, Common Equity Tier 1 funding.

25.
26.

See infra Part II.B.
A recent study by the Financial Stability Oversight Council recommended “that
contingent capital instruments remain an area for continued private sector innovation,
and encourag[ed] the Federal Reserve and other financial regulators to continue to
study the advantages and disadvantages of including contingent capital and bail-in
instruments in their regulatory capital frameworks,” but did not recommend
incorporating cocos into the United States regulatory system at present. FIN. STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON STUDY OF A CONTINGENT CAPITAL
REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN NON-BANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES AND BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES 3 (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents
/Co%20co%20study[2].pdf. For a discussion of how regulatory endorsement can lead
to explosive growth in the market for hybrid instruments, see notes 137–38 and
accompanying text.
27. The Swiss, British and German authorities, as well as the European Union, all
broadly support the use of cocos. Wulf A. Kaal & Christoph K. Henkel, Contingent
Capital with Sequential Triggers, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 221, 243, 245–46 (2012).
28. The strongest demand for Barclays’ cocos was from Asian investors, but U.S.
investors were also interested. Helene Durand, Barclays’ Contingent Capital Bond
Finds Strong Support, REUTERS, Nov. 14, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/
11/14/barclays-cocos-idUSL5E8ME2YP20121114. The cocos offered by Barclays
pose more risk to investors than the cocos discussed in this Article, because they are
written off upon the occurrence of the trigger event, rather than converting to equity.
The prospect of having their investment completely wiped out upon the occurrence of
the trigger event could make investors even more prone to panic, exacerbating the
concerns raised in Part II.B. of this Article.
29. Financial crises can be transmitted around the world by way of the
“interconnectedness of systemic institutions through an array of complex transactions,”
as well as “a severe contraction in global liquidity, cross-border credit availability and
demand for exports.” BASEL III, supra note 10, at 1, 2.
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Banks will resist this, however, because they prefer hybrids as a
cheaper alternative to Common Equity Tier 1 funding.30 As established
in Part I, much of the relative price advantage of debt derives from
skewed governmental policies and incentives, particularly from
structural biases in national tax codes that favor debt over equity.31 Part
III will examine the broad tax literature on reducing corporate bias
towards debt generally, and consider how this literature can be narrowly
applied so as to minimize bank antipathy towards holding Common
Equity Tier 1 regulatory capital. From this preliminary survey of the tax
literature, there seems to be a relatively simple and fairly promising way
of incentivizing banks to fund themselves with more of this type of
capital: the implementation of an “allowance for Common Equity Tier
1” or “ACET1,” which would allow banks to fully deduct the cost of
Common Equity Tier 1 used to satisfy regulatory capital requirements.32
This Article’s recommendation is therefore two-fold: first, the
BCBS should require that all regulatory capital requirements be satisfied
with Common Equity Tier 1 (i.e., the BCBS should no longer recognize
hybrids as regulatory capital). Second, individual countries should be
encouraged to adopt an ACET1 that is based on an optional model
promulgated by the BCBS. Part IV therefore gives some thought as to
how such an ACET1 might be implemented in practice: further input
from economists and tax scholars will certainly be necessary in
developing an ACETI, but it is important to note from the outset that
because this ACET1 would be viewed as a benefit by banks, its
implementation could avoid some of the political barriers and
international coordination problems that hamper most financial
regulatory reforms.33
I. REGULATORY CAPITAL
A. CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
Most developed countries have implemented ex ante minimum
regulatory capital requirements, which are reasonably consistent

30. Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, A Macroprudential
Approach to Financial Regulation, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 11 (2011).
31. See infra notes 263–65 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 299 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part IV.
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throughout the world because they are based on international standards
promulgated by the BCBS.34 These standards require banks to maintain
a minimum ratio of “regulatory capital” (the numerator of the equation)
to “risk-weighted assets” (the denominator of the equation). Under the
first iteration of the BCBS’ standards, colloquially known as “Basel I,”
banks were required to fund themselves with instruments that qualified
as “regulatory capital” in an amount equal to at least 8.0%35 of their
“risk-weighted assets.”36 At least 50% of the required regulatory capital
had to be comprised of instruments that satisfied the criteria for “core”
capital—these instruments included common equity shares, as well as
non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock (and even some innovative
hybrid capital instruments with step-up clauses).37 The remaining 50%
of the required regulatory capital could then be comprised of other types
of instruments (including hybrid instruments) 38 known as
“supplementary capital.”39
The requirements relating to the numerator of the capital ratio
remained largely unchanged under the second iteration of the BCBS’
standards, known as “Basel II,” 40 but Basel II did make significant
changes to how assets were risk-weighted (the denominator of the
ratio). 41 Under Basel I, the risk-weighting of a bank asset was
determined based on which of four “buckets” that type of asset was
assigned to: for example, all U.S. municipal bonds were accorded a 20%
risk-weight and all unsecured loans were accorded a 100% risk-weight.42
But these “buckets” were critiqued as arbitrary and not reflecting the
true risk posed by an asset (in particular, these “buckets” did not reflect
34.
35.
36.

See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 7.
BASEL I, supra note 8, at 13.
“Determining a bank’s risk-weighted assets is a complicated calculation that
reflects the perceived riskiness of assets held by the bank and the perceived likelihood
that a bank’s contingent obligations will crystallize into actual obligations.” Hilary J.
Allen, Cocos Can Drive Markets Cuckoo, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 125, 131 n.23
(2012).
37. BASEL I, supra note 8, at 3, 6, 13.
38. For a discussion of the hybrid instruments that qualified as regulatory capital
under Basel I, see note 124 and accompanying text.
39. See BASEL I, supra note 8, at 4–6.
40. See BASEL II, supra note 10, at 12.
41. DAVID ANDREW SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING STANDARDS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 64 (Eric Helleiner & Jonathan Kirshner eds.,
2007).
42. Patricia A. McCoy, Musings on the Seeming Inevitability of Global
Convergence in Banking Law, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 433, 452 (2001).
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the credit risk of the obligor, such that, for example, all unsecured
borrowers were treated as equally risky).43 Basel II therefore allowed
asset risk-weightings to be determined “either by external ratings
provided by external credit rating agencies (CRAs) or by internal ratings
calculated by banks, based on their own internal models.”44
The financial crisis highlighted many flaws in the capital standards
set out in Basel I and II. In particular, there was recognition that “[t]he
global banking system entered the crisis with an insufficient level of
high quality capital”45; that is, there were problems with the numerator
of the regulatory capital ratio. Many of the instruments that were being
used as regulatory capital (including many hybrid instruments) were not
able to absorb losses as well as common shares and retained earnings.46
Thus, the most recent standards developed by the BCBS (known as
“Basel III”) have a renewed focus on common equity funding.47 Basel
III requires banks to fund at least 4.5% of their risk-weighted assets with
Common Equity Tier 1.48 In practice, however, banks must fund at least
7.0% of their risk-weighted assets with Common Equity Tier 1, or else
face restrictions on their ability to pay dividends and bonuses. 49 In
addition, the BCBS has promulgated additional capital requirements for
global systemically important banks,50 and these requirements will also
need to be met with Common Equity Tier 1.51 However, even though
the BCBS acknowledges that other types of regulatory capital are
inferior to Common Equity Tier 1, 52 it does not mandate that all
regulatory capital requirements must be satisfied with Common Equity
43.
44.

Id. at 453.
Vanessa Le Leslé & Sofiya Yurievna Avramova, Revisiting Risk-Weighted
Assets 37 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 12/90, 2012).
45. BASEL III, supra note 10, at 12.
46. See id. at 2.
47. Id. at 12. The phased implementation of Basel III commenced on January 1,
2013. Id. at 27.
48. Id. at 12.
49. This requirement for 2.5% extra Tier 1 common equity is referred to as the
“Capital Conservation Buffer.” Id. at 55.
50. This extra capital requirement will range between 1% and 2.5% of the riskweighted assets of the bank, depending on its systemic importance. BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS: ASSESSMENT
METHODOLOGY AND THE ADDITIONAL LOSS ABSORBENCY REQUIREMENT 20 (2011),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207.htm.
51. Id.
52. BASEL III, supra note 10, at 12.
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Tier 1. Instead, while Basel III requires banks to maintain total
regulatory capital in an amount no less than 8% of a bank’s riskweighted assets,53 it provides that 1.5% of a bank’s risk-weighted assets
can be held as “Additional Tier 1” instruments (such as perpetual noncumulative preference shares) and 2.0% can be held as “Tier 2”
instruments (including some types of subordinated debt).54 While it is
open to banks to satisfy all of their Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital
requirements with Common Equity Tier 1,55 banks are unlikely to do so
because of the expense they associate with such funding.56
Although Basel III focused most closely on the numerator of the
regulatory capital ratio, there was also an acknowledgment of some of
the failings of the denominator (i.e., the measurement of risk-weighted
assets), and so Basel III introduced a new, non-risk-based leverage ratio
to “introduce additional safeguards against model risk and measurement
error by supplementing the risk-based measure with a simple,
transparent, independent measure of risk.”57 While the BCBS has yet to
finalize the parameters of the leverage ratio, broadly speaking, it will
require banks to hold regulatory capital (either Common Equity Tier 1
common equity or Additional Tier 1 instruments) in an amount equal to
at least 3% of all assets, including off-balance sheet items.58 But this
new leverage ratio acts as a backstop to, rather than replacing, the riskweighted capital ratio.59 This is a conscious policy choice by the BCBS:
while the purpose of regulatory capital requirements is to reduce
leverage by forcing banks to fund more of their activities with equity
and equity substitutes, 60 the BCBS recognizes that not all assets are
equally risky 61 and believes that risk-weighting assets incentivizes
stronger risk-management practices by banks;62 these incentives would
be absent if the BCBS relied primarily on the more simplistic
53. Id. This 8% does not include the capital conservation buffer or capital
surcharges for global systemically important banks. Factoring in these amounts,
regulatory capital requirements could be as high as 13% of risk-weighted assets for the
largest international banks.
54. See id.
55. It is also open to banks to satisfy their Tier 2 capital requirements with
Additional Tier 1 capital.
56. See notes 91–105 and accompanying text.
57. BASEL III, supra note 10, at 4.
58. Id. at 61–63.
59. Id. at 61.
60. See Admati et al., supra note 18, at 8–9.
61. Le Leslé & Avramova, supra note 44, at 28.
62. BASEL II, supra note 10, at 2.

832

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVIII

unweighted leverage ratio. The ratio of regulatory capital to riskweighted assets thus remains the cornerstone of prudential banking
regulation, but there are a number of ways that a bank can understate its
risk-weighted assets to game the ratio and thus fund itself with less
regulatory capital and more debt.63 A bank can use internal models that
underestimate the risk of the bank’s assets,64 or it can use accounting
gimmicks like the “Repo 105” maneuver that was used by Lehman
Brothers to transfer assets off balance sheet whenever it was required to
report on its financial condition. 65 Because the reforms of Basel III
made little change to how assets are risk-weighted, the BCBS’s
standards still afford many opportunities for arbitraging the denominator
of the regulatory capital ratio.
The foregoing discussion makes it clear that, even after the reforms
of Basel III, regulatory capital requirements are still flawed. 66
Nonetheless, regulatory capital requirements remain the centerpiece of
international efforts to improve financial stability. 67 This Article
therefore considers how to maximize the efficacy of such requirements
by undercutting incentives to arbitrage both the numerator and the
denominator of the regulatory capital equation (focusing in particular on
bank incentives to arbitrage the numerator by creating unnecessarily
63. See Charles W. Calomiris & Richard J. Herring, Why and How to Design a
Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement 4–5 (Working Paper No. 11-41, 2012),
available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/11/11-41.pdf.
64. Le Leslé & Avramova, supra note 44, at 7.
65. The report issued by Anton Valukas (the Examiner in the Lehman Brothers
Holdings bankruptcy) concluded that:
Lehman employed off balance sheet devices, known within Lehman as ‘Repo 105’
and ‘Repo 108’ transactions, to temporarily remove securities inventory from its
balance sheet, usually for a period of seven to ten days, and to create a materially
misleading picture of the firm’s financial condition in late 2007 and 2008. . . .
Lehman regularly increased its use of Repo 105 transactions in the days prior to
reporting periods to reduce its publicly reported net leverage and balance sheet.

Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner at 732–33, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.,
445 B.R. 143 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 08-13555 (JMP)), available at
http://jenner.com/lehman/VOLUME%203.pdf.
66. A number of other criticisms have also been leveled at Basel III, including that
it encourages correlation of bank assets to the detriment of systemic stability. See infra
Part IV.A.
67. FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE G20 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL
STABILITY 1 (2012), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications
/r_120619a.pdf; see also Le Leslé & Avramova, supra note 44, at 4.
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complex and problematic hybrid debt-equity instruments). Part I.B will
delve more deeply into these incentives of arbitrage regulatory capital
requirements.
B. INCENTIVES TO ARBITRAGE REGULATORY CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
At their heart, regulatory capital requirements are an attempt to
require banks to fund themselves with less debt. To deliberately oversimplify (thus ignoring hybrid instruments for the moment), banks have
a choice between two types of funding sources: debt or equity.68 The
proportion of equity funding (as opposed to debt funding) used by banks
to make loans and acquire other assets is referred to as leverage—the
less equity funding used, the higher the debt funding and thus the
leverage. 69 Other things being equal, banks prefer to rely on debt
funding (and thus to increase leverage) to enable them to acquire more
assets and multiply their profits in good times.70 However, in bad times,
the amount of debt incurred by the bank to finance its assets will remain
constant even as the value of those assets decreases.71 Instead, a fall in
asset values will reduce (or even wipe out) the value of the equity
funding such assets; because leverage is the ratio of equity funding to
the total value of the asset, leverage will increase as equity is reduced.72
It is easiest to demonstrate this by way of a few simplified mathematical
examples.
Scenario 1:
Assume that an asset, A, is purchased by a bank for $100. The
bank used $20 of its own equity and $80 of borrowed money, to fund
68. Debt can take the form of a loan or a debt security (such as a bond), and
represents a reasonably fixed liability of the debtor. Equity (such as a common share)
is an ownership interest in the issuer of the equity, and the holder of that equity is not
entitled to any fixed return. See RICHARD S. CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING
AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 130 (4th ed. 2008).
69. Andrew W. Lo & Thomas J. Brennan, Do Labyrinthine Legal Limits on
Leverage Lessen the Likelihood of Losses? An Analytical Framework, 90 TEX L. REV.
1775, 1780 (2012). For a simplified calculation of leverage, divide the total asset value
by the amount of equity funding for that asset. TOBIAS ADRIAN & HYUN SONG SHIN,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS, LIQUIDITY AND LEVERAGE 4–5
(2010), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr328.pdf.
70. Lo & Brennan, supra note 69, at 1777.
71. See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch
2007-2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 77, 92 (2009).
72. See ADRIAN & SHIN, supra note 69, at 9.

834

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVIII

the purchase. Leverage is 5% (i.e., 100/20). Assume, then, that the
value of asset A falls to $95. The bank’s $80 debt remains constant,
meaning that the value of the bank’s equity in asset A falls to $15, and
leverage will be 6 1/3% (i.e., 95/15).
Scenario 2:
Assume that an asset, A, is purchased by a bank for $100. The
bank used $10 of its own equity and $90 of borrowed money to fund the
purchase. Leverage is 10% (i.e., 100/10). Assume, then, that the value
of asset A falls to $95. The bank’s $90 debt remains constant, meaning
that the value of the bank’s equity in asset A falls to $5 and leverage
will be 19% (i.e., 95/5).
We can see from these hypotheticals that equity is more lossabsorbent than debt, because the equity funding used to finance an asset
will simply become eroded as the asset’s value declines, whereas debt
obligations remain constant.73 We can also see that the more highlyleveraged a bank is to begin with, the more its leverage will be affected
by a reduction in asset values.74
Once asset values start declining and leverage starts rising, banks
may face regulatory and/or market pressure to readjust their leverage.75
At this point, a bank has two options: it can either start selling its assets,
or raise new equity capital by issuing or selling shares. If the bank is
suffering from any type of distress, it will find it difficult to raise new
common equity capital because of what is known as the “debt overhang”
problem: new investment is discouraged because investors fear that any
73. A report on banking by the United Kingdom’s Independent Commission on
Banking (known as the “Vickers Report”) discusses in detail why equity is more lossabsorbent:
Because the value of a bank’s equity equals the value of its assets less the value of its
(non-equity) liabilities if asset values fall, equity absorbs losses smoothly. Equity
holders know that it is risky. Further, equity is perpetual. A bank does not have to refinance its equity funding periodically, as it does its debt funding (although it may
need to add to it from time to time). So equity cannot ‘run’ in the way that other
liabilities – in particular, deposits and short-term funding – can.

INDEPENDENT COMM’N ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS 86 (2011).
74. It is worth noting that “investment banks . . . were operating at leverage ratios
of 25:1 to 35:1 in terms of debt to equity before many of them collapsed [in the
financial crisis]. With such leverage, even a small quantity of abrupt and adverse
negative news about assets will be sufficient to wipe out equity capital . . . .” Acharya et
al., supra note 5, at 167.
75. ADRIAN & SHIN, supra note 69, at 28.
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new capital they contribute will be immediately applied to the bank’s
existing obligations to senior debtholders, wiping out their new
investment.76 Recapitalization can also be impeded by Akerlof’s famous
“lemons” problem: 77 in a volatile market, potential buyers of bank
shares are likely to assume that capital raising must be necessary due to
problems at the bank. Because of the imperfect information available to
them, these potential buyers will discount the amount that they are
willing to pay for the shares, thus reducing the amount of new equity
funding that a bank can raise by way of issuing or selling shares.78
Given the impediments to recapitalization posed by the “debt
overhang” and “lemons” problems, banks may be left with only one way
to reduce leverage—selling assets. Unfortunately, in circumstances
where there is low liquidity in the market (such as during a crisis when
numerous parties are trying to reduce leverage by way of asset sales), it
will be difficult to find a purchaser for the assets, and sales will be made
at a discount.79 This will drive down the price of equivalent assets,80 and
if a large number of banks (and other financial institutions) are trying to
sell the same assets at the same time, these discounts can be quite
large.81 Falling asset prices will increase the leverage of other banks,
and those other banks will then face pressure to deleverage by selling
assets, creating a vicious cycle.82
Therefore, when highly-leveraged banks deleverage, they often
generate negative externalities for other market participants by
depressing asset prices market-wide. 83 Conversely, because equity
absorbs losses more smoothly than debt, banks with larger Common
Equity Tier 1 holdings (and thus lower leverage) are less likely to need

76.
77.

Hanson et al., supra note 30, at 6.
George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 QUEENS J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970).
78. Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323,
349 (2011).
79. Brunnermeier, supra note 71, at 92.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Brunnermeier refers to this as the “fire sale externality.” Id. at 94.
83. Whitehead describes the effects of these externalities as follows: “As different
managers experience similar effects, they are likely to react in the same way by each
selling assets, causing greater price volatility and prompting further sales. The result is
a cascading decline in value, with greater coordination impairing each firm’s ability to
manage its own risk exposure.” Whitehead, supra note 78, at 326–27.
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to sell assets or raise new capital in the first place.84 If deleveraging
does become necessary for these banks, they may be able to do so by
way of raising new equity capital, avoiding asset sales and the negative
externalities associated with such sales. This is because larger holdings
of Common Equity Tier 1 make the “debt overhang” problem less of an
issue: holders of this type of equity are the most junior claimants in any
bankruptcy and their claim is only residual (i.e., they have no hard claim
to any assets of the bank), so they will not take priority over any new
investment.85 To the extent that a bank is funded with more Common
Equity Tier 1 vis-à-vis debt, new investors have less reason to fear that
their capital investment will be wiped out by more senior debt-holders.
Furthermore, where a bank is already funded with a substantial amount
of Common Equity Tier 1, the financial situation of the bank is more
simple and transparent,86 and this may work to reduce the information
asymmetries that cause the “lemons” problem, increasing the amount
potential buyers are willing to pay for bank shares.87
A bank that funds itself with larger cushions of Common Equity
Tier 1 will therefore be both better able to recapitalize and better able to
absorb any losses that it suffers. This is likely to inspire market
confidence. 88 With market confidence, such banks are less likely to
suffer from the types of liquidity runs that brought down institutions like

84. Admati and her colleagues note that “[t]he destabilizing effects of simultaneous
deleveraging by asset sales would be greatly reduced if banks were much better
capitalized, because the required level of sales is much reduced when the initial
leverage is much lower.” Anat Admati et al., Debt Overhang and Capital Regulation 31
(Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 114, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031204.
85. See Admati et al., supra note 18, at 10.
86. In contrast, it is more difficult for banks to reveal the true value of their more
risky assets. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 9.
87. With better information about the issuer available to potential investors,
investors have less reason to fear a hidden problem at the bank, and so they will charge
less for their investment (issuers will also need to expend less on disclosure to bridge
any informational asymmetry). Furthermore, a less leveraged bank is less susceptible
to changes in asset values, and as such, there will be fewer instances where drastic
recapitalization is required. The expense of new equity issuances can be avoided;
instead, equity cushions can be slowly repleted with retained earnings. See Admati et
al., supra note 18, at 37.
88. Admati et al. note that “[w]ith greater capital cushions, there would be less risk
of such systemic breakdowns from mutual distrust.” Id. at 8.
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Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, 89 and society as a whole is less
likely to suffer from the negative externalities associated with the failure
of financial institutions.90 Society thus has a vested interest in banks
funding themselves with more Common Equity Tier 1, hence the
implementation of regulatory capital requirements. Banks, however, are
more focused on their internal cost of capital and view Common Equity
Tier 1 as a more expensive form of funding than debt; there is thus a
tendency for banks to prefer highly-leveraged funding profiles, 91 and
thus to arbitrage regulatory capital requirements. The higher cost of
Common Equity Tier 1 is usually explained by reference to the higher
required return on, and informational sensitivity of, equity, but as the
discussion below will show, tax policies and other government subsidies
for debt are the real drivers of banks’ preference for leverage.
i. Required Return on Equity
One reason generally cited for the higher cost of Common Equity
Tier 1 vis-à-vis debt is that bank shareholders require a higher return on
their shares than bank creditors do on their debt, in order to compensate
the shareholders for the risk they take as residual claimants.92 But while
it is true that shares do require a higher rate of return than debt, Admati
and her colleagues have persuasively disputed that an increase in the
89. Prior to its failure, Lehman Brothers had substantial amounts of hybrid
instruments on its books. Fleischer, supra note 14, at 9. One of the concerns regarding
Lehman Brothers immediately prior to its bankruptcy was that the valuations of its
assets were unclear, such that counterparties and regulators could not tell whether it had
sufficient capital, or was insolvent. As such, the market lacked confidence in Lehman
as a counterparty, which compromised its access to short-term funding and thus its
liquidity. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 324–
25 (2011). For further discussion of the demise of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers,
see notes 241–47 and accompanying text.
90. The instability of financial institutions affects the availability of credit, and in
turn, economic growth. Allen, supra note 14, at 9–10. Because of this reduction in
credit and economic growth, financial crises can result in increased unemployment,
poverty and crime. Stephen L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 207 (2008).
91. Hanson et al., supra note 30, at 20.
92.
The expected return on equity is usually different than on debt because the investors’
returns are contingent on many unforeseeable factors related to the success of the
firm’s business strategy. This contingency is typically perceived to make the equity
investments riskier than investments in bonds (which are debt instruments), and, as a
result, equity investors typically demand a higher return for their investments.

Benshalom, supra note 2, at 1229.
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percentage of Common Equity Tier 1 funding will, in and of itself, raise
total funding costs for banks.93 Admati et al.’s conclusion is based on
the work of Modigliani and Miller, which has been summarized as
follows:
[T]he Modigliani and Miller paradigm exposes the flaw in the
following reasoning: “Equity is more expensive than debt because it
is riskier. Thus, if a bank is forced to rely more on equity, its overall
cost of finance will go up, and it will have to charge more for its
loans.” The fallacy here is that the risk of equity, and hence its
required return, is not a constant, but rather declines as leverage
falls. Indeed, when all the Modigliani and Miller conditions hold,
this effect is just enough to offset the increased weight of the moreexpensive equity in the capital structure so that the overall cost of
94
capital stays fixed as bank leverage varies.

It is therefore not axiomatic that it is more expensive for banks to
fund themselves with more Common Equity Tier 1. Although the
required return on equity for a highly-leveraged bank will be higher than
the interest rate on debt, as the risk profile of that bank is made more
conservative with more Common Equity Tier 1 funding, both
shareholders and debtholders will be subject to less risk and should
demand less of a return, and thus the total cost of funding should not
increase.95
ii. Informational Sensitivity
The higher cost of Common Equity Tier 1 has also been attributed
to the increased informational sensitivity of equity, 96 but just as with
required return on equity, this higher cost is not a constant. Generally
speaking, debt is more informationally insensitive than shares because
93. Admati et al., supra note 18, at 16–17. “‘Economizing’ on equity itself has an
effect on the riskiness and, therefore, on the required expected return of equity. This
effect must be taken into account when assessing the implications of increased equity
capital requirements for banks’ cost of capital.” Id. at 17.
94. Hanson et al., supra note 30, at 17.
95. Admati et al. demonstrate this with the following numerical example: “[G]iven
10% equity capital the required return was 15% for equity and 5% for debt, for an
average cost of 10%×15% + 90%×5% = 6%. With 20% equity capital the required
return for equity falls to 10% (with a 5% cost of debt), leading to the same average cost
of 20%×10% + 80%×5% = 6%.” Admati et al., supra note 18, at 17 n.25.
96. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 8.

2013]

BANK INCENTIVES AND TAXATION

839

returns on debt are fixed, whereas returns on shares are much more
volatile.97 So long as default by the debt issuer is unlikely, a debtholder
only needs to know the terms of the debt instrument to determine the
value of the debt, whereas a shareholder needs to know detailed
information about the operations of the issuer of the shares in order to
price those shares. This informational insensitivity of debt ensures that
it is more marketable then shares—much less diligence is required on
the part of the purchasing investor—which increases the liquidity of
debt and results in a discount in price when compared with shares.98
However, as a bank’s risk profile becomes more leveraged (and thus the
bank becomes more likely to default on its debt), the certainty that the
bank will be able to meet its commitment to repay debt becomes
compromised. Potential debtholders must then devote more time to
investigating the solvency of the bank, making debt more
informationally sensitive, less liquid, and more expensive.99 Thus, if we
focus on the total cost of a bank’s funding, while shares may be more
informationally sensitive (and thus expensive) than debt, a larger
cushion of Common Equity Tier 1 also preserves the informational
insensitivity (and thus cheaper cost) of debt. So, at least theoretically,
the total cost of funding should not increase (and bank profits should not
decrease) as leverage is decreased.100
iii. Tax Policies and Other Subsidies for Debt
In practice, however, lower leverage is more expensive for banks.
This is largely a result of distortive tax policies and implicit government
subsidies that favor debt.101 First, debt is rendered cheaper for banks
because they have access to deposit insurance (which subsidizes the cost
of “borrowing” from depositors), as well as access to emergency
97.
98.
99.
100.

Admati et al., supra note 18, at 26.
Id.
Id.
There is, of course, an entire field of behavioral finance that repudiates (or at
least discounts) the rationality of investors, suggesting that investors’ demand for return
is motivated less by risk and informational asymmetries, and more by irrational
sentiments and popular narratives. See, e.g., GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J.
SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE MARKET AND WHY
IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009). This literature is compelling, but it is not
considered in detail in this Article. Because behavioral finance does not provide any
unified explanation that suggests that equity is more expensive than debt, this Article
does not need to rebut it.
101. Admati et al., supra note 18, at 3.
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funding from central banks acting in their capacity as “lender of last
resort” (which reduces the risk that banks will default on their noninsured debt, making that debt cheaper for banks to issue).102 By the
same logic, an implicit subsidy is conferred by governments—and
therefore indirectly, by taxpayers—upon the debt of banks that are
perceived to be “too big to fail”.103 Although financial reform efforts in
the wake of the financial crisis have targeted this issue (for example, the
United States’ Dodd-Frank Act describes itself as legislation that will
“end ‘too big to fail’”), there is a general consensus that these subsidies
persist notwithstanding the reforms that have been in put in place to
date.104 In addition to these subsidies, most countries have tax rules in
102. Id. at 23–24. For further discussion of deposit insurance and central banks as
lenders of last resort, see infra Part IV.A.
103. Acharaya and his colleagues have noted that government guarantees of too-bigto-fail institutions make debt cheaper than equity. Because of these guarantees, large,
complex financial institutions “will have an incentive to lever up by borrowing at
government-subsidized rates and investing in spread (or carry) trades.” Acharya et al.,
supra note 5, at 157. Given this persistent implicit government backing, it makes little
sense for these types of institutions to hold increased amounts of equity: with more
equity, the bank’s shareholders would bear losses in a crisis, while an absence of equity
would mean that those losses could be distributed to taxpayers in a bailout. KENNETH R.
FRENCH ET AL., THE SQUAM LAKE REPORT: FIXING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 55 (2010).
104. For a detailed discussion of the provisions of Dodd-Frank that purport to
prevent future bailouts of financial institutions, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Narrow
Banking: An Overdue Reform that Could Solve the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem and Align
U.S. and U.K. Regulation of Financial Conglomerates (Part 1), BANKING & FIN.
SERVICES POL’Y REP., Mar. 2012, at 8–12. Notwithstanding implementation of
financial reform around the world, there is a general skepticism of the claim that the
political powers that be will actually let such failures occur. This is because there is no
real credible alternative to a bail-out or an unwieldy bankruptcy of large financial
institutions with international operations: “For a resolution process to have any chance
of succeeding, it must be cross-border in scope; yet there are strong political reasons to
believe that such an international agreement will be difficult or impossible to achieve . .
. .” SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 207 (2010). In the United States, for example, the
orderly resolution authority conferred on the FDIC by Title II of Dodd-Frank does not
cater to the complexity and transnational nature of large banks. Furthermore, even
post-Dodd-Frank, there is scope for federal assistance for financial institutions. See
generally Wilmarth, Jr., supra at 8–12; Simon Johnson, The Myth of The Resolution
Authority, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com
/2011/03/31/the-myth-of-resolution-authority/; Stephen J. Lubben, Resolution, Orderly
and Otherwise: B of A in OLA, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 485 (2013). As such, “despite all the
. . . ‘no more taxpayer-funded bailout’ clamor included in recent financial reform
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place that cause banks to favor debt over equity.105 As long as such tax
rules and government subsidies remain in force, banks will have strong
incentives to arbitrage regulatory capital requirements so as to enable
them to increase their leverage.
Since the financial crisis, a deep literature has emerged on how to
end subsidies for institutions deemed “too big to fail”: many argue that
this can only be achieved by drastic structural reform (proposals include
breaking up the mega-banks 106 and ring-fencing their banking
activities). 107 These proposals are worthy of consideration, but this
Article does not seek to contribute to the literature on “too big to fail.”
In addition, it does not seek to challenge the subsidies associated with
deposit insurance, or access to central banks as lenders of last resort: the
Article accepts that these subsidies are a worthwhile price to pay for
policies that genuinely enhance financial stability.108 Instead, this paper
focuses on the more neglected issue of how tax incentives affect banks,
and leaves issues regarding government subsidies to other scholars.
It would therefore be helpful to know from the outset just how
much of banks’ preference towards debt is tax-driven, and how much is
driven by government subsidies. Unfortunately, as far as I am aware,
there are no studies that directly address this issue. There are some data
available, though, on the value of the implicit “too big to fail”
government subsidy: since the financial crisis, a number of studies have
sought to quantify the impact of this subsidy on the funding cost for
large banks. The research of Baker and McArthur suggests that the
value of the subsidy for large banks averaged 29 basis points over the
period starting in 2000 and ending with the fall of Bear Stearns, and
averaged 78 basis points in the period starting with the fall of Lehman

legislation, bailouts in the future are likely if circumstances become sufficiently
severe.” Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH.
U. L. REV. 149, 224 (2010). The continuing lower cost of funding for systemically
important institutions reflects market support for this view. See Viral V. Acharya et al.,
The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit State Guarantees 20–
21 (Mar. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1961656.
105. Tim Edgar, Financial Instability, Tax Policy, and the Tax Expenditure
Concept, 63 SMU L. REV. 969, 998, 1000 (2010). These will be examined in detail in
Section 4.A.
106. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 104, at 214–17.
107. See generally INDEPENDENT COMM’N ON BANKING, supra note 73; see also
Wilmarth, supra note 104, at 1.
108. Admati et al., supra note 18, at 23–24.
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Brothers and ending in the middle of 2009.109 Acharya, Anginer and
Warburton found that the average value of the subsidy per year during
the period from 1990 through 2010 was 28 basis points, peaking at an
average of 120 basis points in 2009.110 The latter two studies considered
only U.S. banks—Ueda and Weder di Mauro estimate that
internationally, large banks had a funding cost advantage of roughly 60
basis points at the end of 2007 and 80 basis points at the end of 2009.111
Though the results of these studies vary, the consensus seems to be that
the impact of being “too big to fail” on bank funding cost is usually well
under 100 basis points (1.00%), although it becomes more valuable in
the depths of a crisis.112
“Too big to fail” institutions are not the only banks that receive
government subsidies. Around the world, most banks (no matter what
their size) are beneficiaries of deposit insurance and have access to
central banks as lenders of last resort.113 As far as I am aware, however,
there are no studies that seek to quantify the “value” for banks of access
to lenders of last resort. The data are also sparse with respect to deposit
insurance: most of the empirical studies consider how much it costs
deposit insurers to provide insurance, 114 rather than the value of that
deposit insurance to banks. One study, however, does consider the
impact of the introduction of deposit insurance on deposit interest rates
(i.e., the cost of deposit funding) for banks around the world. 115
Somewhat counter-intuitively, this study finds that when deposit
109. DEAN BAKER & TRAVIS MCARTHUR, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH,
THE VALUE OF THE “TOO BIG TO FAIL” BIG BANK SUBSIDY 2 (2009).
110. Acharya, et. al., supra note 104, at 4. The study also found that subsidies
persist notwithstanding the passage of Dodd-Frank. Id. at 19–20.
111. Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy
Values for Systemically Important Financial Institutions 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund,
Working Paper No. 12/128, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/wp/2012/wp12128.pdf.
112. Although we have no data on the value to banks of access to central banks as
lenders of last resort, presumably this would also be higher during a crisis.
113. See infra notes 332–35 and accompanying text.
114. For a survey of this literature, see Thomas L. Hogan & William J. Luther,
Explicit and Implicit Costs of Government-Provided Deposit Insurance 30 (2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2083662.
115. Francesca Carapella & Giorgio Di Giorgio, Deposit Insurance, Institutions and
Bank Interest Rates 1 (Columbia Univ. Dept. of Econ. Discussion Paper Series, Paper
No. 0304-06, 2003), available at http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/
ac:116049.
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insurance is introduced in a country, it has very little impact on the
interest rates that banks in that country pay on deposits,116 suggesting
that the deposit insurance subsidy isn’t overly valuable to banks.
Turning now to tax, there is a sizable empirical literature that
investigates the impact of tax policies on the cost of debt and equity for
corporations generally. Most of the studies on corporate debt bias relate
to individual countries, however, and because of differences among
countries’ corporate tax rates, tax treatment of investor income, and
accounting policies, it is difficult to generalize about how much of the
cost of equity can be traced back to tax policies. That said, the empirical
work that has been done on individual G7 countries indicates that
“[t]hese distortions create advantages to the use of debt measurable in
hundreds of basis points.” 117 Although this literature does not look
specifically at banks, 118 banks face the same tax incentives as other
corporations119 and so the findings regarding corporations can act as a
rough guide to the impact of tax policies on the cost of bank funding.120
And so we have data which suggest that the availability of deposit
insurance has little impact on banks’ cost of deposit funding, the “too
big to fail” subsidy is usually worth much less than a hundred basis
points, and that tax distortions affect funding decisions in the order of
hundreds of basis points. Furthermore, the value of the “too big to fail”
subsidy seems to be cyclical (it is more valuable in bad times), whereas
tax distortions are constant. This analysis of the relative impact of tax
policies and other subsidies on the cost of bank debt and equity is very
ad hoc, and would benefit from further research by economists.
Nonetheless, it suggests that addressing tax incentives that favor debt is
the reform that will have the single biggest impact on bank incentives to
arbitrage regulatory capital requirements. Indeed, there is already a
116. Id. at 19. The authors note that though deposit insurance does not significantly
impact deposit interest rates, it does encourage banks to make riskier loans with higher
interest rates.
117. Michael Keen, Alexander Klemm & Victoria Perry, Tax and the Crisis, 31
FISCAL STUD. 43, 49 (2010), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/
j.1475-5890.2010.00107.x/pdf.
118. Id. at 52.
119. Id.
120. “[T]he size of the effects of corporate taxation on the financial structure of
banks is close to the ones for non-financial firms.” Serena Fatica, Thomas Hemmelgarn
& Gaetan Nicodeme, The Debt-Equity Tax Bias: Consequences and Solutions 9
(European Comm’n Taxation Papers, Paper No. 33, 2012), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/economic
_analysis/tax_papers/taxation_paper_33_en.pdf.
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broad consensus that banks will not issue hybrid instruments if those
hybrids do not receive preferential tax treatment,121 which suggests that
only the significant tax savings associated with debt-equity hybrids
justify the costs associated with developing and marketing those
instruments (i.e., that government subsidies alone do not make hybrids
sufficiently attractive to banks).122 If we can address tax incentives so
that Common Equity Tier 1, hybrids, and debt are all treated the same
from a tax perspective, we can therefore quash bank incentives to
develop new and complicated debt-equity hybrids.
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH HYBRID INSTRUMENTS
Given banks’ general preference for debt over equity as a funding
source, it is not surprising that banks have sought to develop instruments
that have enough equity-like features to be counted as regulatory capital,
but also have debt-like features that make the instruments cheaper than
Common Equity Tier 1.123 Basel I and II were amenable to counting
these “hybrid debt capital instruments” as part of banks’ regulatory
capital, so long as:
 they [were] unsecured, subordinated and fully paid-up;

121. Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 168. Given that the United States Internal
Revenue Service is unlikely to treat cocos as debt, U.S. banks may not end up issuing
cocos. Viva Hammer, Sam Chen & Paul Carman, Tax Treatment of Contingent
Convertible Bonds, DERIVATIVES & FIN. INSTRUMENTS 97 (2011). It has also been
suggested that (tax issues aside) for cocos to really take-off, cocos need to be classified
as debt in order to appeal to the large fixed income market. LOUISE PITT ET AL.,
CONTINGENT CAPITAL: POSSIBILITIES, PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES 4–5 (2011),
available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/public-policy/regulatoryreform/contingent-capital.pdf
122. Stephen Fiamma, tax partner at Allen & Overy, pithily summed up this
attitude: “Banks and lawyers are working hard to come up with the holy grail of an
instrument that meets both Basel requirements and the IRS requirements for tax
deductibility. Until that happens, why would any bank bother with CoCos?” Liam
Vaughn, Basel Regulators Force Banks to Cut Plans for Contingent Convertible Bonds,
BLOOMBERG, July 19, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-19/baselregulators-force-banks-to-cut-contingent-convertible-plans.html.
123. “[Hybrids’] appeal to issuers is that they look like relatively cheap equity.”
Anousha Sakoui et al., Regulatory Thaw Helps Hybrid Return, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3,
2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fc74723a-9f48-11df-8732-00144feabdc0.html#
axzz24PujkslK; see also Candemir Baltali & Joseph Tanega, Basel III: Dehybridization
of Capital, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 24–26 (2011).
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they [were] not redeemable at the initiative of the holder or
without the prior consent of the supervisory authority;
they [were] available to participate in losses without the bank
being obliged to cease trading (unlike conventional subordinated
debt);
although the capital instrument may carry an obligation to pay
interest that cannot permanently be reduced or waived (unlike
dividends on ordinary shareholders’ equity), it should allow
service obligations to be deferred (as with cumulative preference
shares) where the profitability of the bank would not support
payment.124

Although these requirements ensured that hybrid instruments had
some equity-like characteristics, hybrids remained inferior substitutes
for Common Equity Tier 1 because they were not sufficiently lossabsorbent.125 This is largely due to one debt-like characteristic of hybrid
instruments (which was common to most hybrid instruments issued
prior to the financial crisis): the amounts due thereunder remained
constant even in the face of declining values of the very assets they
financed.126 Therefore, just as with more traditional debt instruments,
reductions in asset values had the potential to trigger destructive
deleveraging behavior. 127 Furthermore, the debt overhang problem
applied to these hybrid instruments in the same way it applied to debt,128
albeit to a lesser degree, because holders of hybrid instruments had more
senior claims on the assets of the bank than holders of Common Equity
Tier 1.129 Although investors in hybrids were typically subordinated to
other debt creditors,130 this fact provided little comfort to new investors
in shares: new investors feared that any new capital they invested would
be wiped out in satisfying the more senior claims of the hybrid

124.
125.
126.

BASEL I, supra note 8, at 16.
Baltali & Tanega, supra note 123, at 24.
Admati et al., supra note 18, at 10–11. The BCBS has sought to address this
issue in Basel III by requiring that hybrid instruments include provisions that allow
them to be written-down, or converted into common equity. These new requirements
are discussed infra, Part II.B.
127. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
129. Baltali & Tanega, supra note 123, at 27–28.
130. See id.; Admati et al., supra note 18, at 10.
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instrument holders. 131 Accordingly, hybrid instruments impeded
recapitalization in a way that Common Equity Tier 1 does not.
In addition, Common Equity Tier 1 is relatively transparent and
simple to understand, at least when compared with more complex hybrid
sources of funding.132 Other things being equal, market participants are
more likely to have confidence in the solvency of a bank with a funding
cushion made up of Common Equity Tier 1, as opposed to a funding
cushion comprised of less predictable hybrid instruments.133 This type
of market confidence reduces the risk of runs on such bank’s short-term
funding, and thus reduces liquidity risk for the bank and makes it more
stable. 134 In contrast, relying on complex and unpredictable hybrid
instruments leaves more scope for uncertainty and panic—and this is not
just a problem at the individual bank level. Hybrids also increase the
amount of risk in the financial system as a whole: complex instruments
may “creat[e] complications that increase the likelihood that [defaults]
will occur and diminish the ability of investors and other market
participants to anticipate and avoid these [defaults].” 135 In contrast,
Common Equity Tier 1 is relatively simple and well-understood, and
therefore is less likely to exacerbate systemic risk.136
To make this hypothetical discussion of the inferiority of hybrid
instruments more concrete, Part II.A looks in detail at the performance
during the financial crisis of one particular hybrid instrument, the trust
preferred security or “TruPS.”

131.
132.

See Hanson et al., supra note 30, at 9.
The IMF notes that the use of hybrids results in “increased complexity and
opacity of financial arrangements.” INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 11.
133. Baltali & Tanega, supra note 123, at 20–21.
134. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
135. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity In Financial Markets, 87 WASH.
U. L. REV. 211, 214 (2009). For a general discussion of the problems associated with
introducing complex new financial products into an already complex financial system,
see generally Allen, supra note 14.
136. “The purported purpose of whittling down the hybrid capital instruments and
phasing out innovative hybrid instruments is to reduce the specter of future
idiosyncratic and systemic crises in the international banking sector.” Baltali & Tanega,
supra note 123, at 17; see also INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 11.
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A. TRUST PREFERRED SHARES – A CAUTIONARY TALE
The TruPS is a type of hybrid security that became extremely
popular in the United States in the years prior to the financial crisis.137
TruPSs are created when a bank (or bank holding company (“BHC”))138
issues subordinated debt to a trust company, and then that trust company
issues preferred shares to investors.139 Investors are paid dividends on
the preferred shares, and those dividend payments are funded by the
interest payments on the subordinated debt made by the bank or BHC to
the trust. 140 Because TruPSs are structured so that the bank or BHC
makes interest payments on the subordinated debt rather than paying
dividends on the preferred shares, the return on these instruments is taxdeductible at the bank/BHC level, and so they are cheaper to issue than
shares. 141 Usually, TruPSs mature after 30 years, and allow for the
suspension of dividend payments for up to five years during that 30-year
period 142 ; while dividend payments to TruPSs holders are suspended,
dividends continue to accumulate, and no dividend can be paid to any
common shareholder of the bank or BHC while dividends are owed to
TruPSs holders.143 Because TruPSs allow for dividend accumulation,
pursuant to the criteria set forth in Basel I and II, TruPSs could not be
used to satisfy “core” capital requirements for banks.144 Banks could
use TruPSs as “supplementary” capital, however.145 Furthermore, the
United States Federal Reserve developed a special rule for BHCs in
1996, allowing BHCs (but not banks)146 to satisfy up to 25% of their

137. Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 176; UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, DODD-FRANK ACT: HYBRID
CAPITAL INSTRUMENTS AND SMALL INSTITUTION ACCESS TO CAPITAL 11–12 (2012),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587759.pdf.
138. A “bank holding company” is a company that owns or controls a bank in the
United States. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (2006).
139. UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 137, at 2 n.2.
140. Id. “The bank holding company has 100 percent ownership of the trust and
usually guarantees the interest and principal payments of the TruPs.” Acharya et al.,
supra note 5, at 161.
141. Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 175.
142. UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 137, at 11–12.
143. Id. at 24.
144. Basel I provides that “cumulative preferred stock” does not qualify as “Tier 1”
or “core” capital under the Basel I standards. BASEL I, supra note 8, at 3.
145. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
146. UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 137, at 2.
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“core” capital requirement with TruPSs,147 so long as they “provide[d]
for a minimum five-year consecutive deferral period on distributions to
preferred shareholders . . . [and were] subordinated to all subordinated
debt and have the longest feasible maturity.”148
Even though TruPSs can be quite expensive to implement,149 they
were cheaper than issuing common shares, 150 and the combination of
regulatory endorsement and cheaper cost led to rapid growth in the
United States TruPSs market from 1996 onwards, particularly amongst
BHCs. By December of 2010, BHCs had outstanding over $128 billion
of TruPSs, representing 10% of all BHC Tier 1 capital.151 In hindsight,
however, the inferiority of TruPSs to Common Equity Tier 1 is clear,
and the popularity TruPSs enjoyed as regulatory capital was
problematic. TruPSs entail a contractual obligation to repay the full
principal amount after a fixed term (usually 30 years), and also include a
contractual entitlement to dividends. While payment of dividends can
be suspended for up to five years, they will accumulate in the interim.152
Holders of TruPSs therefore have a fixed claim on the assets of the
issuing bank, so TruPSs do not absorb losses as smoothly as Common
Equity Tier 1 (holders of common equity have no fixed claim to any
repayment).153 Because holders of TruPSs have claims on the issuing
bank that are senior to those of the bank’s common shareholders (and
because suspension of dividend payments on TruPSs also required
suspension of dividend payments on common shares), TruPSs also
147. Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 175. The concept of “bank holding company”
regulation is a uniquely American construct. Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar,
That Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company
Regulation in the United States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 113, 114 (2011). As such,
the BCBS does not expressly address bank holding companies in its standards, but the
United States opted to implement the majority of the Basel I, II and III standards for
bank holding companies as well as banks: one notable deviation from these standards
was to allow BHCs to count TruPSs towards their core regulatory capital requirements.
UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 137, at 7.
148. Press Release, Federal Reserve, Board Approval of the Use of Certain
Cumulative Preferred Stock Instruments in Tier 1 Capital for Bank Holding Companies
(Oct. 21, 1996), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/
1996/19961021/default.htm.
149. Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 175.
150. Id. at 176.
151. UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 137, at 13.
152. Id. at 21–22.
153. See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text.

2013]

BANK INCENTIVES AND TAXATION

849

perpetuate the debt overhang problem and make recapitalization more
difficult.154
In addition to being inferior from a loss-absorbency and
recapitalization perspective, TruPSs provide a good illustration of the
unnecessary complexity and uncertainty that can be created when hybrid
debt-equity instruments are developed to arbitrage regulatory capital
requirements. For example, the dividend suspension feature was
included in TruPSs solely to ensure that they could be counted as
regulatory capital. 155 This suspension feature would make the
instruments more “equity-like,” because it would mean that TruPS
holders had no right to fixed payment from the issuer during the
suspension period (instruments are more loss-absorbent when they don’t
entitle the holder to a fixed payment). 156 However, contractual
mechanisms in hybrid instruments do not always work as envisaged.
During the financial crisis, many TruPS issuers did not exercise their
contractual right to suspend dividend payments, because of the fear that
the suspension would be viewed as a “red flag” by the market, and
induce short-selling that would reduce the price of the issuer’s common
stock and otherwise make funding in the capital markets more
difficult.157 Where dividends were not suspended, the loss-absorbency
promise of TruPSs was not realized. Many other TruPS issuers did
suspend dividend payments, however, 158 which meant that the
instruments operated inconsistently in the market, generating uncertainty
amongst current and potential investors.
Finally, because TruPSs were considered cheaper than common
shares, and because the BCBS (and particularly in the case of BHCs, the
Federal Reserve) had given these instruments their imprimatur,159 many
smaller banks and BHCs sought a way to enter the TruPS market.
However, the implementation costs seemed prohibitive for many smaller
154. UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 137, at 24. See
supra note 84 and accompanying text for further discussion of the debt overhang
problem.
155. Press Release, Federal Reserve, supra note 148.
156. INDEPENDENT COMM’N ON BANKING, supra note 73, at 86.
157. UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 137, at 23.
158. “As of February 2010, nearly 270 U.S. small banks had deferred interest
payments on their trust preferred securities.” Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 177.
159. “[L]egal and regulatory regimes did not discourage, limit or prohibit excessive
hybridization but rather provided an imprimatur for the issuance and trade of hybrid
capital structures to the detriment of the entire global banking system.” Baltali &
Tanega, supra note 123, at 4.
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institutions.160 The solution to this problem was to add another layer of
complexity to the financial system by pooling and securitizing the
TruPSs of smaller institutions, creating collateralized debt obligations
(“CDOs”).161 This worked well for a time, but as the market for CDOs
dried up during the financial crisis, smaller BHCs could no longer sell
their TruPSs and were deprived of a source of capital on which they had
come to rely. Without this source of capital, many institutions found
themselves in financial difficulty, and would have benefitted from the
ability to renegotiate the terms of the TruPSs with investors, or to offer
an exchange of TruPSs for common shares.162 Unfortunately, because
so many TruPSs were pooled and securitized, it was difficult for
individual TruPS issuers to “identify and gain approval for
recapitalization transactions from the ultimate . . . investors.” 163 The
final result was that a sizable number of smaller BHCs defaulted on their
TruPSs payment obligations 164 (and many others still have these
instruments on their books, impeding recapitalization).165
The inadequacy of TruPSs as loss-absorbent capital affected all
institutions. The funding difficulties experienced by institutions that had
pooled their TruPSs primarily affected smaller BHCs. Fortunately,
because systemically important financial institutions were not greatly
affected, the consequences of TruPSs’ complexities did not really
reverberate around the financial system. Nonetheless, the experience
with TruPSs illustrates that untested hybrid instruments often do not
react as expected during crisis situations. Because of the problems
associated with TruPSs, they are now being phased out of the regulatory
capital regime in the United States, but this transition will be
complicated and time consuming.166 TruPSs should therefore serve as a
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 176.
Id.
UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 137, at 25.
Id.
“According to a leading credit rating agency, of the 605 banking institutions in
pooled trust preferred securities that have deferred dividends since January 1, 2007,
some . . . 29 percent have defaulted . . . .” Id. at 23.
165. Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 177.
166. Acharya et al. describe the transitional arrangements as follows: “[Dodd-Frank]
gives banks with more than $100 billion in capital up to five years to phase out these
securities and up to 10 years for institutions with capital between $15 billion and $100
billion. As a compromise, the amendment exempts small banks with capital less than
$15 billion and allows them to continue to treat existing TruPSs on the balance sheet as
Tier 1 capital. . . . Moody’s Investors Service estimates that in total nearly $118 billion
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cautionary tale, and regulators should be wary of endorsing complicated
and untested instruments by allowing them to count towards a bank’s (or
a BHC’s) regulatory capital requirements.
B. COCOS: THE NEXT GENERATION OF HYBRIDS
Because of the poor performance of TruPSs and other hybrid
instruments during the financial crisis, such instruments came under
scrutiny by the BCBS as it developed Basel III.167 The result is that
Basel III requires banks to satisfy much more of their regulatory capital
requirements with Common Equity Tier 1, and phases out the use of
some hybrid instruments.168 However, Basel III still allows some hybrid
instruments to be counted towards regulatory capital169 so long as they
can be written-down or converted into common shares170 (the BCBS has
determined that such features will make the hybrid instruments more
loss-absorbent).171 As such, Basel III does not reject hybrid instruments

of TruPSs will be disqualified from Tier 1 treatment across all bank holding
companies.” Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 161–62. “[M]any of [the five-year dividend
suspension periods] will expire around the same time as banks are supposed to be
phasing out trust-preferred securities under Basel III. The timing leaves those banks a
little more than a year to earn enough to start winding down their reliance on the
securities. Some banks that issued trust-preferred securities may have to sell or file for
bankruptcy protection if they are unable to find another solution.” Rachel Witkowski,
Pressure Mounts for Banks to Unload Trust-Preferred Securities, AM. BANKER, Aug.
22, 2012, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_163/pressuremounts-for-banks-to-unload-trups-1052053-1.html.
167. Hybrids also came under scrutiny at the national level in the United States, with
section 171 of Dodd-Frank effectively prohibiting bank holding companies from
satisfying their Tier 1 regulatory capital requirements with TruPSs. Furthermore,
section 174 of Dodd-Frank required the GAO to carry out a study of the use of hybrid
instruments to satisfy regulatory capital requirements for bank holding companies. The
results of this study were set out in UNITED STATES GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 137.
168. “Innovative hybrid capital instruments with an incentive to redeem through
features such as step-up clauses, currently limited to 15% of the Tier 1 capital base, will
be phased out.” BASEL III, supra note 10, at 2.
169. Under Basel III, banks can use hybrids to satisfy regulatory capital
requirements in an amount equal to 3.5% of risk-weighted assets. See supra notes 48–
51 and accompanying text for further discussion of quantitative capital requirements
under Basel III.
170. Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, supra note 21.
171. Id.
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entirely; instead, it seeks to limit the quantity and improve the quality of
hybrid regulatory capital.172
In response to Basel III’s new qualitative requirements for hybrid
instruments, banks and national regulators have taken a keen interest in
a new type of instrument known as a “contingent convertible bond” or
“coco.” 173 While there is no official definition of what constitutes a
“coco,” 174 as generally conceived, a coco is a hybrid debt-equity
instrument that starts its life as a debt instrument (like a bond) but will
convert to common shares upon the occurrence of a “trigger event,” thus
providing the issuing bank with a fresh infusion of common shares.175
This trigger event is the novel and distinguishing feature of a coco, and
is intended to address the loss-absorbency problem posed by previous
generations of hybrids: once the trigger event occurs, the instrument will
automatically and irrevocably convert from debt into loss-absorbent
common shares.176 However, there is not yet a consensus about what
should constitute a trigger event. Some prefer market-based triggers,
such that sufficiently large decreases in the share price or increases in
the CDS spread of the issuing bank would trigger conversion.177 Others
172.
173.

Id.
The Swiss have been at the forefront of implementing national infrastructure
for coco issuances. For further discussion of the Swiss treatment of cocos, see Allen,
supra note 36, at 138–39; Kaal & Henkel, supra note 27, at 244–45. British and
German authorities have also given serious thought to implementing national regimes
for cocos. See Kaal & Henkel, supra note 27, at 243, 245–46. The U.S. has to date
been more cautious about cocos, concluding that they should remain a matter for
private sector experimentation for now. FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL,
supra note 26, at 3. To date, only Lloyds, Credit Suisse, Rabobank and Barclays have
engaged in coco issuances, but other banks have shown interest in the instrument. See
Allen, supra note 36, at 139–40. For example, Bank of America Merrill Lynch has also
commented on investor demand for cocos. Matthew Attwood, Basel Pops CoCo Market
Hope, REUTERS, June 27, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/27/us-cococredit-ifr-idUSTRE75Q2BX20110627. Regarding previous issuances, see Allen, supra
note 36, at 139–40, and Kaal & Henkel, supra note 27, at 246.
174. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 34–37, have summarized in tabular
form some of the varied design features proposed for cocos.
175. CEYLA PAZARBASIOGLU ET AL., INT’L MONETARY FUND, CONTINGENT
CAPITAL: ECONOMIC RATIONALE AND DESIGN FEATURES 4 (2011), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1101.pdf.
176. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 50, at 18.
177. See, e.g., Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 17; PITT ET AL., supra note
121. Coffee and Kaal & Henkel support the use of market-based triggers. John C.
Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need For
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view these market-based triggers as inviting market manipulation. 178
Some prefer a trigger that is based on the issuing bank’s regulatory
capital ratio; 179 however, this is potentially subject to accounting
manipulation by the issuing bank, and in any event can prove a lagging
indicator of the bank’s health. 180 Finally, some have expressed a
preference for giving financial regulators discretion in determining
whether a trigger event has occurred,181 but this type of trigger breeds
uncertainty in the market and the risk of this type of conversion could
prove impossible to price. 182 Furthermore, some have expressed
concerns regarding the reluctance of regulators to actually call a trigger
event, for fear of sending a negative signal about the issuing bank to the
market.183
Much of the current academic discussion of cocos focuses on these
trigger design issues.184 However, as I have argued elsewhere, cocos are
problematic notwithstanding the design of the trigger event, because
they incentivize behavior that is likely to detrimentally impact
confidence in, and thus the liquidity of, the issuing bank, potentially
bringing about the failure of the very institution that the cocos were
intended to recapitalize.185 The thesis of my argument is that, at the time
of purchase, buyers of cocos will tend to underestimate the risk of

Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 830–31 (2011); see
also Kaal & Henkel, supra note 27, at 232.
178. “Price manipulation (via short-selling) and the self-fulfilling threat of equity
dilution could inflict a confidence-induced downward spiral that eventually triggers
conversion.” PAZARBASIOGLU ET AL., supra note 175, at 24.
179. The cocos issued by Lloyds in 2009 had a capital based trigger: they included a
provision that the notes would convert into a fixed number of common equity shares if
the ratio of Lloyd’s core Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets were to fall below 5%.
ASS’N FOR FIN. MKTS. IN EUROPE, PREVENTION AND CURE: SECURING FINANCIAL
STABILITY AFTER THE CRISIS (2010).
180. Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 169; Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 16.
181. Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, supra note 21.
182. ASS’N FOR FIN. MKTS. IN EUROPE, supra note 179, at 48–49; PITT ET AL., supra
note 121, at 13.
183. “[R]egulators and supervisors have shown time and again that they are hesitant
to opine negatively about SIFIs in a way that will become public. Such forbearance
leads to protracted delays in recognizing problems.” Calomiris & Herring, supra note
63, at 16.
184. Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on the Possible Application of Contingent
Capital in Corporate Governance, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 281,
287, 299–302 (2012).
185. Allen, supra note 36, at 128.
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conversion into common shares186 (both because of cognitive biases187
and computer-based risk models that tend to underestimate the
occurrence of low-probability events188), and so the risk of conversion
will not be properly reflected in the coco price. At a later date, if the
trigger event and the accompanying automatic and irrevocable
conversion into common shares suddenly do seem likely, this will spur a
flurry of panic selling (both of the cocos themselves and of stock of the
issuing bank), short selling of the issuing bank’s stock, and purchases of
credit default swaps that reference the issuing bank. 189 All of this
activity (and its impact on stock prices and CDS spreads) is likely to
damage confidence in the issuing bank,190 and this damaged confidence
is likely to manifest itself in runs on short-term funding – the issuing
bank is thus liable to experience a liquidity crisis from which
recapitalization from coco conversion may be unable to save it. 191
While there is surprisingly little discussion in the literature as to how
much recapitalization would be needed (and therefore, how much
contingent capital would need to be issued and convert) to return a
distressed bank to health, the IMF has cast some doubt on the view that
a bank could ever hold enough convertible capital to forestall a liquidity
crisis.192 As Joseph Sommer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York

186.
187.

Id. at 157.
“Individuals tend to ignore low probability catastrophic events.” Henry T.C.
Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise
of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1488 (1993).
188. For example, most financial institutions use some form of VaR, or value-atrisk, model to calculate how much they stand to lose on investments on any given day.
However, the VaR model relies on historical data to calculate future risk – “VaR
estimates future losses based on the assumption that the market will perform in the
future as it performed in the past.” Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the DoddFrank Act: Directors’ Risk Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 55, 71 (2011). As such, VaR discounts low probability losses that are not
reflected in historical data (what constitutes “low probability” varies from model to
model, depending on the historical data inputted and the institution’s confidence level).
For further discussion, see Peter Conti-Brown, A Proposed Fat-Tail Risk Metric:
Disclosures, Derivatives, and the Measurement of Financial Risk, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
1461, 1462–65 (2010).
189. Allen, supra note 36, at 158–60.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 162.
192. “[F]orestalling a liquidity crisis with convertible debt would require large
amounts of such debt and may require extending the coverage of debt-equity
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noted, “[b]alance-sheet capital isn’t too relevant if you’re suffering a
massive run.” 193 The only option left open to the bank at this point
would be to seek liquidity assistance from the central bank in its
capacity as the “lender of last resort,”194 invoking the very government
intervention that cocos were designed to avoid.195
The potential for cocos to trigger runs thus militates against any
regulatory endorsement of these instruments: the harm that cocos can
cause derives from their status as an indicator of the issuing bank’s
health, so it is not enough to just reduce the percentage of regulatory
capital that can be comprised of cocos—even a small number of cocos
issued to raise regulatory capital can be problematic. And cocos don’t
just pose risks to individual banks: there is a systemic risk dimension to
these instruments as well.196 The conversion of one bank’s cocos and
their attendant loss in value may require any other banks that have
invested in those cocos to start selling assets in order to deleverage.197
Furthermore, to the extent that investor banks keep the converted shares
of the coco issuer, they will find themselves residual claimants in the
coco issuer (whereas before they were higher ranking debt-holders),
increasing inter-bank exposure and interconnectedness.198 Conversion
of one bank’s cocos is also likely to make the markets skittish about
cocos in general (even cocos that are issued by banks that seem to be
stable), potentially encouraging panicked sell-offs of cocos that would
conversion to unsecured senior debt under the bail-in schemes.” PAZARBASIOGLU ET
AL., supra note 175, at 16.
193. Email from Joseph Sommer, Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to
Patrick M. Parkinson, Deputy Research Director, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System et al. (July 13, 2008), Re: another option we should present re triparty?;
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 89, at 324.
194. Central banks perform the role of lender of last resort by making loans to
distressed banks which are secured by the bank’s assets, effectively creating a market
for the bank’s assets when there is no public market for them. Thomas M. Humphrey,
Lender of Last Resort: What It Is, Whence It Came, and Why The Fed Isn’t It, 30 CATO
J. 333, 355 (2010).
195. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 26.
196. Systemic risk has been defined as “the risk that (i) an economic shock such as
market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the
failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to
financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its
availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility.” Schwarcz,
supra note 90, at 204.
197. Charles A.E. Goodhart, Are CoCos from Cloud Cuckoo-Land?, VOX (June 10,
2010), http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/5159.
198. See id.
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destroy their value. 199 Again, to the extent that other banks have
invested in cocos and are seeing their value fall, this may necessitate
destructive deleveraging by those other banks.200
Cocos thus seem inherently problematic from a systemic stability
perspective. From the perspective of issuing banks, cocos’ one
redeeming feature seems to be the lower cost associated with cocos
because of debt-like tax treatment. 201 Nonetheless, cocos continue to
receive support from many academics and policymakers.202 One strand
of literature that has recently developed in support of cocos stresses the
benefits they provide as a tool for governance, by incentivizing both
existing shareholders and coco holders to improve discipline of coco
issuers.203 The discussion below will demonstrate, however, that many
of these governance benefits are overstated,204 and they do not justify the
systemic risks posed by the instruments.

199.
200.
201.

Id.
See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
Acharya et al. comment that “bankers like it only if it is capital for regulatory
purposes and debt for tax purposes . . . .” Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 168. It should
be noted, though, that at this stage it is not certain whether all nations will treat cocos as
debt for tax purposes. Switzerland has indicated that it will, which has likely been
crucial to the development of cocos in that country. Elena Logutenkova & Klaus Wille,
UBS, Credit Suisse May Need to Boost Capital to 19%, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 4, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-04/ubs-credit-suisse-must-boost-capital-tomeet-swiss-regulator-requirements.html. The FSOC has indicated that, in the United
States, cocos would not be tax-deductible: “There would be substantial challenges to
characterizing [contingent capital] as debt for U.S. income tax purposes.” FINANCIAL
STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 26, at 17. In that case, U.S. banks would
likely have little incentive to issue contingent capital. Acharya et al., supra note 5, at
168.
202. See supra notes 173–74 and accompanying text.
203. The BCBS briefly refers to the potential governance benefits of cocos and
suggests that they might result in, for example, “the bank maintaining a cushion of
common equity above the trigger level, a pre-emptive issuance of new equity to avoid
conversion, or more prudent management of ‘tail-risks.’” BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, supra note 50, at 18. For a more in-depth discussion of the governance
benefits of cocos, see Coffee, supra note 177, at 795, Kaal & Henkel, supra note 27;
and Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63.
204. Admati et al. share this skepticism of the governance benefits provided by
cocos – they note: “We have seen no compelling argument that contingent capital that
has a debt-like structure prior to conversion has a positive impact on governance
problems sufficient to justify including it in capital regulation.” Admati et al., supra
note 18, at 55.
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i. Shareholder Discipline
Professor Coffee makes a persuasive argument that, prior to the
financial crisis, “shareholder pressure led managers to take on higher
leverage and accept greater risk in the boom years—with catastrophic
consequences [ . . . ].” 205 Proponents of the governance benefits of
cocos (including Coffee) argue that the incentives of existing bank
shareholders can be reoriented so that they resist highly-leveraged risk
profiles,206 if those shareholders fear the dilution that will follow coco
conversion.207 This begs a question: if shareholders were willing to push
management for increased leverage and short-term profits prior to the
financial crisis, even in the face of the potential failure of the firm
(which would wipe out shareholder interests entirely), then why would
the mere fear of dilution by coco conversion be enough to incentivize
shareholders not to push for leverage in the future?
At least in the context of banks that are perceived as “too big to
fail,” there is a plausible answer to this conundrum: shareholders in
these banks do not truly expect to be wiped out, because they expect that
such banks will be bailed out by the government.208 There is arguably
less scope for government intervention in coco conversion (especially if
the cocos are triggered by a more objective capital- or market-based
mechanism), 209 and therefore shareholders of “too big to fail” banks
might fear conversion/dilution more than they do bank failure.
However, it is wrong to say that cocos preclude government intervention
entirely. Especially if the cocos are structured so that they are triggered
at the discretion of the regulator, it is quite plausible that markets will
expect forbearance from the government with respect to
205.
206.

Coffee, supra note 177, at 810–11.
Id. at 807, 828; Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 13. The BCBS argues,
in a similar vein, that shareholder governance benefits will accrue if “a sufficiently high
number of new shares are created upon conversion to make the common shareholders
suffer a loss from dilution.” BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 50, at
18.
207. Kaal & Henkel propose a model that allows for a change of control following
coco conversion, and argue that fear of loss of control will create similar salutary
incentives for bank shareholders. Kaal & Henkel, supra note 27, at 264.
208. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 3. This expectation was generally
honored (other than for shareholders in Lehman Brothers) during the Financial Crisis,
and likely persists notwithstanding the innovations made by Dodd-Frank and other
financial reforms around the world. See notes 103–07 and accompanying text for
further discussion of this issue.
209. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 4.
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conversion/dilution in the same way that they currently expect a
bailout. 210 Furthermore, it is not outside the realm of possibility that
even with capital- or market-based triggers, national governments could
become so nervous about the systemic effects of the conversion of a
particular bank’s cocos211 that they would intervene to avoid conversion
(or at least markets might calculate that governments might take such an
approach).212 In any of these circumstances, shareholders would have
no more incentive than they do now to agitate for more prudent
leverage.
Assuming, however, that existing bank shareholders do fear
dilution by way of coco conversion more than they fear the failure of the
bank itself, the corporate governance literature suggests other reasons to
be skeptical about the discipline that such shareholders might exert.213
Most fundamentally, an expectation of this type of discipline is
premised on the willingness and ability of shareholders to work together
in pressuring management to generate stable profits over the longerterm. Shareholders would, with reasonable consistency, have to be
content to forego short-term profits—which can be magnified by
leverage—in favor of longer-term stability. This would only work if the
bulk of shareholders were committed to holding the bank stock for
reasonably long periods of time.214 The data show, however, a trend in
210. If regulators believe that coco conversion will have a negative signaling effect
about the issuing bank (which is quite likely), then they may drag their feet in ordering
a conversion. See PAZARBASIOGLU ET AL., supra note 175, at 25. Coffee, supra note
177, at 806, notes that there is always a concern that “regulators, because of political or
legal controversies, will fail to intervene.”
211. See supra notes 209–13 and accompanying text.
212. Such a “too big to convert” subsidy would therefore make cocos less costly
than they should otherwise be, and thus more popular for banks to issue. This could
potentially create an asset bubble. For further discussion of moral hazard issues
relating to coco conversion, see Coffee, supra note 177, at 840–41.
213. A significant body of empirical literature calls into question the desirability of
shareholder governance. For a survey of this literature, see Lynn A. Stout, The
Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 798–803 (2007).
However, this Article will not address this literature: it proceeds on the assumption that
shareholder governance can be beneficial, and focuses on questioning the efficacy of
bank shareholder governance.
214. Shareholder short-termism persists, notwithstanding that many measures have
been proposed to try and curb it. See, e.g., THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, OVERCOMING SHORTTERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS
MANAGEMENT (2009), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/
content/docs/pubs/overcome_short_state0909_0.pdf.
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the opposite direction: institutional shareholders in particular are holding
shares for shorter periods of time.215 More transient shareholders have
greater incentives to agitate for short-term profits, even if the strategies
employed to achieve such profits have the potential to destabilize the
firm, and thus risk conversion/dilution, in the long run.216
One might expect longer-term shareholders to have greater
incentives to avoid conversion/dilution, but shareholder apathy has been
well documented.217 Bank shareholders often have a highly diversified
pool of investments, and as such they may not be willing to invest their
time in policing the management of one individual bank.218 While it is
true that apathetic long-term shareholders are less likely than transient
shareholders to actively push for increased leverage, bank managers also
have incentives to increase leverage,219 and apathetic bank shareholders
do little to check management behavior. Even where shareholder will is
present, many shareholders lack the ability to assess notoriously
complex and opaque bank balance sheets: it may be unreasonable to
expect these shareholders to understand enough of the bank’s risk
profile to influence and discipline management. 220 This is a fortiori the
215. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 296–97 (2012).
216. Id. at 302–04.
217. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 213, at 792. Kaal also notes that cocos could create
a false sense of security, thus dissuading monitoring efforts: “If the market in
contingent capital securities should evolve with CCS designs that provide sufficient
protections and guard against systemic risks and contagion, it seems theoretically
possible that decision makers could rely on the design of CCS and neglect their role as
monitors.” Kaal, supra note 184, at 310.
218. Fleischer, supra note 14, at 9. An additional argument has been made that
there are few incentives for existing bank shareholders to agitate for the bank to be less
leveraged, because by making the remaining debt safer, a reduction in leverage results
in a transfer of value from the shareholders to the debt holders. Admati et al., supra
note 84, at 41.
219. “If the corporation were financed mostly with equity, such executives would
share in the upside if things go well, but they would also share in the downside if things
go badly. If the corporation is financed mostly with debt, on the other hand, the
managers’ upside potential is amplified, and their downside risk remains limited.”
Fleischer, supra note 14, at 8. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann,
Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247 (2010).
220. “Evaluation of the creditworthiness of any bank requires analyses of its balance
sheet, operations, management, competitors, and so on. Information on each of these
elements is at best only partly disclosed to bank investors, and even in the absence of
moral hazard problems, creditworthiness can vary over time from changes in ordinary
business operations.” Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking
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case when the risks that need to be disciplined are “tail” risks that will
only really come to light in financial crises, and which, by definition, are
hard to predict.221
Expecting bank shareholders to impose discipline on bank
management in ordinary times thus seems aspirational at best, even if
the shareholders are distantly threatened by dilution of their
shareholdings upon a coco conversion. However, as a crisis brews and
coco conversion suddenly seems likely, shareholder apathy is likely to
evaporate, and shareholders are likely to become much more motivated
to sell their shares in the bank.222 The difficulties inherent in accurately
assessing the bank’s risk profile persist, though, and may even deepen in
a crisis. 223 As such, this type of selling is not really informed market
discipline: instead, it is more of a panic, a reflection of herd behavior
and rumors about the distress of the issuing bank,224 as well as a desire
to get an “early-mover advantage” by selling stock before other
shareholders do so.225 Widespread panicked sales by shareholders will
depress the issuer’s stock price, potentially below any price that is a
rational reflection of the risk profile of the issuer. Facing this kind of
downward pressure on its stock price, the issuing bank may be
incentivized to attempt to improve its risk profile by sharply restricting
lending and selling its assets in a fire sale:226 indirectly, then, cocos have
System, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 261, 275 (2010). A recent survey by
Barclays found that a majority of bank investors either do not understand or trust the
risk-weights assigned to such bank’s assets. Haldane & Madouros, supra note 16, at 21.
221. See supra notes 187–88 and accompanying text. Acharya et al. are skeptical of
the ability of cocos to address tail risks:
[B]anks can – as they have in the past – take bets on the tail risk of the economy . . . .
A property of taking on such tail risk is that the only outcomes possible are boom or
bust, and the intermediate region of risk outcomes over which contingent capital
might have some bite is essentially rendered rather unlikely or inconsequential. Such
tail-risk seeking would likely have to be addressed through means other than pure
reliance on a contingent capital requirement.

Acharya et al., supra note 5, at 166.
222. Allen, supra note 36, at 159.
223. Market discipline is likely to be particularly confused in a time of crisis. M.
Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Paying Bank Examiners for Performance, 35 REG.
32, 36 (2012).
224. AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 100, at 55–56.
225. Brunnermeier, supra note 71, at 96.
226. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 50, at 20. At this stage,
equity markets are likely to be inaccessible for the bank, so a fresh recapitalization will
not be an option. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 15.
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incentivized socially harmful deleveraging behaviors that are the very
externalities that regulatory capital requirements were created to
avoid.227
In sum, shareholder discipline of coco issuers is likely to be largely
ineffective during normal times, but potentially destructive during
crises. As such, the threat of dilution posed by cocos is unlikely to
prompt any meaningful, socially beneficial improvement in shareholder
governance of banks. The next Part will consider whether the creation
of a new class of interests, cocoholders, will inspire any better
governance.
ii. Cocoholder Discipline
At least prior to conversion, cocos are more debt-like than equitylike. The generally accepted view is that debtholders are superior to
shareholders in terms of the discipline they exert on bank
management:228 extrapolating from this, prior to conversion, cocoholders
should theoretically be more effective than shareholders in exerting
discipline over bank management. However, many of the factors that
impede shareholder governance of banks are also at work with respect to
debtholders: the opacity of banks’ operations, risk and balance sheet
deters governance,229 as does the apathy inherent in any investor that
holds a large group of diversified investments.230 Furthermore, there is
an increasing trend towards the decoupling of debtholders’ contractual
rights from exposure to the debt issuer (for example, by purchasing a
CDS that will make them whole in the event the debt issuer fails), which
“weakens their incentives to assess and monitor debtors’ repayment
ability.”231 The experience of the financial crisis supports skepticism
about debtholder governance living up to its theoretical promise; at least
for banks, there seems to have been little by way of discipline from
debtholders in the boom years leading up to the financial crisis.232

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
FRENCH ET AL., supra note 103, at 44.
Admati et al., supra note 18, at 28.
See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling:
Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 663, 665 (2008).
232. Admati et al., supra note 18, at 34–35.
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While the fear of conversion may render cocoholders somewhat
more motivated than ordinary debtholders to discipline management,233
cocoholders are likely to underestimate the risk of conversion (which
will only occur in low-probability, high-consequence tail events),234 and
thus it is unlikely that cocoholders will exert pressure upon management
until a tail event seems imminent.235 At this late stage, it is likely that
pressure from the cocoholders will take the form of panicked sales of
cocos and shorting of the coco issuer, rather than measured and
informed discipline. 236 If the cocos have a market-based trigger and
market activity causes the issuing bank’s share price to fall low enough
(or conversely, CDS spread to rise high enough), then this will trigger
conversion.237 Even if changes in stock prices or CDS spreads do not
immediately reach the levels necessary for conversion (or if the cocos
have regulator- or capital-based triggers instead of market-based
triggers), these changes will be interpreted by other financial institutions
as red flags, damaging confidence in the issuing bank. If market
participants lack confidence in the issuing bank, they may withdraw or
restrict such bank’s access to short-term funding (such as that provided
through the repurchase agreement market),238 and without such funding,
a bank’s decline is likely to be precipitous. 239 Even if a bank could
survive the beginning of such a liquidity run, that run would inspire
further drops in the bank’s stock prices, and corresponding increases in
its CDS spreads.240 This could set off market-based triggers, or the loss
233. The BCBS notes that, depending on how conversion is structured,
“[c]ontingent capital holders may have an extra incentive to monitor the risks taken by
the issuing bank due to the potential loss of principal associated with the conversion.”
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 50, at 18.
234. Allen, supra note 36, at 135–36, 157.
235. Id. at 157–58.
236. Id. at 158. It is also important to note that sales and shorting by cocoholders
will not occur in a vacuum – shareholders in the bank and speculators will also engage
in sales and shorting activity. Id. at 159–60.
237. This scenario has been referred to as a “death spiral”, whereby “the dilution of
the existing stockholders’ claims that would occur in a conversion lowers the stock
price, which leads to more dilution, which lowers the price even further.” FRENCH ET
AL., supra note 103, at 56.
238. Allen, supra note 36, at 155–56.
239. If a financial institution does not have a sufficiently large and liquid capital
cushion, a run on its short-term funding sources can render it insolvent and illiquid
almost overnight. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 89, at 326.
240. Allen, supra note 36, at 162.
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of liquidity could force the regulator to exercise any power it has to
declare a trigger event, thereby bringing about conversion.241
If conversion of the cocos does occur, one can argue that the cocos
have implicitly failed to achieve their governance objectives: the specter
of conversion should have encouraged sufficiently prudent management
such that the cocos would never have converted.242 Nonetheless, Coffee
and Kaal and Henkel have proposed models for cocos that are structured
to give governance a second chance, by creating new voting blocs postconversion. Kaal and Henkel propose that cocos should be structured
with two sequential triggers:243 assuming that both triggers are tripped,
Kaal and Henkel’s proposal would create a post-conversion voting bloc
of shareholders with supermajority voting powers.244 Coffee’s proposal
would create a new voting bloc of preferred shareholders with interests
aligned with debt holders, rather than common shareholders.245 Both of
these newly-created voting blocs would be very motivated to press for
more prudent management.246 However, motivation counts for little if
the newly-created voting constituencies don’t have enough time to
pressure the management of the issuing bank to recapitalize, and
management doesn’t have enough time to respond: 247 because coco
conversion will only occur following a tail-event (and most likely

241. Because capital ratios are a lagging indicator of a bank’s health, cocos with a
capital-based trigger would probably not convert before the liquidity crisis brings down
the issuing bank. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 5. For example, on March 16,
2008, news broke that Bear Stearns would be acquired by JPMorgan (supported by
substantial government assistance) notwithstanding that “[a]t all times during the week
of March 10 to 17, up to and including the time of its agreement to be acquired by JP
Morgan, Bear Stearns had a capital cushion well above what is required.” FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 89, at 288.
242. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 12–13.
243. The first trigger would convert the coco into equity. The second trigger would
only occur if the financial situation of the issuing bank did not improve after the capital
infusion rendered by the occurrence of the first trigger. This second trigger would
increase the voting rights of the former cocoholders (now equity holders). Kaal &
Henkel, supra note 27, at 230–31.
244. Kaal & Henkel, supra note 27, at 231.
245. Coffee, supra note 177, at 806.
246. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 27.
247. “If the new preferred shareholders are to be given voting rights in the hope that
this will alter corporate governance at the issuer and/or affect managerial preferences,
such an issuance cannot come at the twelfth hour if it is to work.” Coffee, supra note
177, at 831.
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amidst a liquidity crisis), bank failure—or the need for government
intervention—is likely to follow hard upon conversion.248
In a bid to address timing constraints, Coffee makes a novel
proposal for incremental conversion of cocos, which would allow for
earlier triggering and thus more time for discipline.249 Instead of waiting
for a tail event to occur, Coffee’s proposal would allow for partial
conversion of cocos even if there has been only a moderate stock price
decline. While Coffee concedes that it would be extreme for all cocos
to convert because of “a moderate stock price decline (which might
occur for extrinsic reasons and later be reversed),”250 Coffee suggests
that perhaps 25% of the cocos could convert upon a 25% drop in stock
price (as measured from the stock price at the date of issuance). 251
Thereafter, a further 25% of cocos would convert upon a further 25%
drop in stock price, and so on.252 However, the marketability of cocos
structured in such a way is questionable: if even a partial conversion
were to occur after only a moderate drop in stock price, investors would
likely require a prohibitive spread on cocos ex ante to compensate them
for the risk of premature conversion (what the IMF terms “false
positives”).253
Assuming, however, that cocos structured as per Coffee’s proposal
would be marketable, it is worth putting the potential efficacy of these
cocos to an (admittedly unscientific) test, by superimposing this
hypothetical incremental conversion structure on the actual decline of
Bear Stearns. If we hypothesize that Bear Stearns had issued cocos at its
actual record high stock price of $171.51 (hit on January 12, 2007),254
we see that no conversion would have occurred until the stock price fell
below $128.63 (being 75% of $171.51), which occurred on July 26,
2007. 255 On March 16, 2008, Bear Stearns had to be rescued by
JPMorgan (with the backing of the United States government); 256
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Allen, supra note 36, at 128.
Coffee, supra note 177, at 807, 834–35.
Id. at 830.
Id.
Id.
PAZARBASIOGLU ET AL., supra note 175, at 24.
Daniel Burns, 12 Key Dates in the Demise of Bear Stearns, REUTERS, Mar. 17,
2008, http://blogs.reuters.com/from-reuterscom/2008/03/17/12-key-dates-in-the-demise
-of-bear-stearns/.
255. Company Report of Bear Stearns Cos., BLOOMBERG LAW (on file with author).
256. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 89, at 290.
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Coffee’s proposal would therefore have allowed seven-and-a-half
months for a new post-conversion voting block to pressure Bear Stearns’
management to recapitalize, and for management to respond. This
seven-and-a-half month timeframe is a “best case scenario,” given that it
discounts the very real likelihood that conversion of Bear Stearns’
hypothetical cocos would have inspired a liquidity crisis that increased
the pace of Bear Stearns’ decline, 257 but even this best case scenario
might not have provided enough time for recapitalization. For example,
Lehman Brothers’ first real financing problems surfaced in March of
2008,258 and from that time onwards Lehman faced significant pressure
from regulators and markets to raise capital and otherwise deleverage. It
did manage to make significant strides in improving its capital and
liquidity positions,259 but unfortunately it was unable to improve enough
to earn the confidence of the financial markets, and Lehman was forced
to file for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008.260 Six months therefore
proved to be an insufficient period of time to restructure Lehman’s risk
profile, so seven and a half months may similarly have been insufficient
time for Bear Stearns to undergo its own risk profile restructuring (and if
Bear Stearns had issued cocos when its stock was trading lower than its
record high price of $171.51, conversion would have come later and left
even less time for recapitalization).
Looking at the examples of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, it
seems questionable whether even a staggered, early trigger system for
coco conversion would allow time for converted cocoholders to have a
meaningful impact on the governance of banks (it is also questionable
whether there would be any market for cocos with this type of staggered
trigger). It therefore seems that any voting bloc created post-conversion
is likely to be ineffectual in saving an ailing bank, and if the governance
benefits of cocos are illusory, cocos have little by way of redeeming
features other than their cheaper cost for banks. 261 The BCBS and
national governments should reject cocos, and other hybrid instruments,
and require all regulatory capital to be comprised of Common Equity

257.
258.

See supra notes 185–91 and accompanying text.
Lehman’s share price was relatively solid towards the end of 2007, but started
to fall quite dramatically after the Bear Stearns acquisition was announced in March of
2008. After a brief improvement in April, it continued its downward slide through the
summer of 2008. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 89, at 325–26.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 339.
261. Admati et al., supra note 18, at 53.
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Tier 1. 262 To subdue bank resistance to this approach, the next Part
considers ways of neutralizing banks’ incentives to fund themselves
with hybrid instruments and to arbitrage regulatory capital requirements
more broadly.
III. FIXING TAX INCENTIVES
A. TAX BIASES AGAINST EQUITY
Tax codes subsidize corporate debt when they make interest
payments on debt tax-deductible for a corporation, while equity returns
(e.g., dividends paid on common shares) are not.263 Because most tax
codes make interest expense tax-deductible at the corporate level, the
only tax paid on interest is the tax paid by the holder of the debt (e.g.,
the bondholder). Dividends, being the equivalent return on equity,
however, are taxed at the level of both the corporation and the equity
holder (e.g., the shareholder). 264 While tax codes are by no means
uniform as between different countries, a tax structure that favors debt
over equity to at least some degree is standard in most countries.265 This
tax preference in favor of debt is not an inevitability, however, but rather
a policy choice resting on an arbitrary foundation.266
262. Although some might fear that an increase in common equity holdings will
circumscribe the ability of banks to extend credit, this fear is unfounded: as long as
banks’ total level of funding remains constant, they can continue to make the same
amount of credit available (i.e., as far as banks’ ability to lend goes, the debt-equity
composition of this funding pool is irrelevant – they can issue more equity to allow
them to lend more). Admati et al., supra note 18, at 43. Hanson et al. did not find
sufficient empirical evidence to support any correlation between equity ratios and loan
rates. Hanson et al., supra note 30, at 18.
263. Edgar, supra note 105, at 998–99; see also INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note
11, at 5. The reasons for the different tax treatment of debt and equity are largely
historical: they were “originally developed to address the problem of controlling
shareholders financing their privately held corporations through debt to avoid higher
taxes on dividends.” Benshalom, supra note 2, at 1246.
264. Daniel Shaviro, The 2008 Financial Crisis: Implications for Tax Reform 4–5
(NYU Center for Law, Econ. and Org., Working Paper No. 09-35, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442089.
265. Edgar, supra note 105, at 998–1000. The IMF also refers to the “almost
ubiquitous practice of allowing interest payments, but not the cost of equity finance, as
a deduction against CIT.” INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 5.
266. The reasons for the different tax treatment of debt and equity are largely
historical: they were “originally developed to address the problem of controlling
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When a corporation can deduct interest payments on its debt, the
managers of that corporation are incentivized to continue to fund the
corporation with debt, rather than equity, up to the point where the
internalized costs of corporate instability resulting from leverage
outweigh the benefits associated with the cheaper funding (or the point
where debt funding ceases to be a cheaper option, because the
corporation is charged a higher interest rate due to its perceived
riskiness).267 In the context of banks, this equilibrium is likely to be
reached only after significant amounts of leverage have been incurred,
as many of the costs of instability can be externalized to society at
large.268 In particular, where the bank in question is perceived as “too
big to fail” and therefore implicitly supported by a government safety
net, debt costs will not increase in a way that truly reflects the risk
associated with increased reliance on debt funding, so there is little
incentive to restrain leverage. 269 Accordingly, regulatory capital
requirements have been put in place with respect to banks, forcing them
to fund themselves with more Common Equity Tier 1 and thus limit
their leverage. 270 But there remains an underlying tension between
regulatory capital requirements, which require banks to rely on equity
funding, and tax incentives, which discourage banks from funding
themselves with equity. If we can neutralize the tax incentives that
encourage banks to favor debt, then that should be sufficient to stop
banks from seeking to arbitrage the numerator of the regulatory capital
equation by developing new and complicated debt-equity hybrids. 271
Addressing tax incentives for debt, if done carefully, can also
significantly lessen incentives to arbitrage the assessment of a bank’s
“risk-weighted assets” (the denominator of the regulatory capital

shareholders financing their privately held corporations through debt to avoid higher
taxes on dividends.” Benshalom, supra note 2, at 1246. See also Fatica et al., supra note
120, at 6.
267. Edgar, supra note 105, at 1001.
268.
[W]hen firms borrow, they are likely to internalize the expected bankruptcy costs they
themselves incur but not the impact of their own failure and default on others (effects
that are not present in the use of equity finance). These externalities are likely to be
especially large for financial institutions, given their systemic importance.

INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 12. See also Edgar, supra note 105, at 1001.
269. Admati et al., supra note 84, at i.
270. See supra Part I.A.
271. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.
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equation) by way of accounting manipulation and favorable risk
modeling.272
B. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
This Part considers proposals that have been made in tax literature
to address corporate debt bias generally, and it narrows the application
of those proposals to banks and their regulatory capital. 273 First,
however, some caveats: one might argue that, at least with respect to
banks that are the beneficiaries of “too big to fail” implicit subsidies, it
is insufficient to neutralize tax incentives for debt, and tax incentives
should go so far as to favor equity over debt.274 In addition, a number of
Pigouvian tax-based solutions have been proposed to address the
externalities imposed on society by the activities of large, interconnected
financial institutions, including taxes on the activities, transactions, and
profits of such institutions, as well as the bonuses they pay. 275 This
Article does not consider any of these proposals in any depth. In
addition, this Article does not attempt to fix corporate debt bias
generally, nor does it advocate for an overhaul of the broader tax
system: the fiscal costs of making all corporate equity tax-deductible
would be far in excess of what is proposed by this Article. Instead, this
Article has the limited goal of minimizing bank incentives to arbitrage

272. It should be noted that this type of arbitrage does not entail the same sunk costs
as developing and marketing new hybrid products, and so persistent government
subsidies for debt will always encourage banks to understate their risk-weighted assets
to some degree, even if the tax incentives are addressed.
273. Fleischer also advocates reform of debt bias that is targeted only at financial
institutions. He argues that this is justified on the grounds that financial institutions
“are the source of most of the externalized social costs of excessive leverage.”
Fleischer, supra note 14, at 11.
274. See, e.g., Edgar, supra note 105, at 998. There is by no means universal
support for this type of policy – it has been rejected outright by the IMF: “Some would
argue, for example, that non-tax factors create an inherent tendency toward excessive
leverage and that the tax system ought therefore to actively disfavor debt. But there is
no consensus on the precise nature and magnitude of such inefficiencies, or on the
relative merits of tax and regulatory responses in addressing them. Neutrality of tax
arrangements remains a core benchmark for policy evaluation and design in this as in
other areas of tax design, and provides useful organizing framework for the discussion.”
INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 4.
275. Shackelford et al., supra note 9, at 796.
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regulatory capital requirements. 276 Finally, this Article does not
consider how to design a transition from the current regime: 277 this
remains a project for future research. Having now established the scope
of the endeavor, we turn to the tax literature on corporate debt bias.
Although national tax codes differ around the world, they share
some similarities. One such similarity is that, generally, the return on
equity is taxed twice, at the corporate and the investor level, whereas
interest on debt is only taxed at the investor level. 278 This creates a
pervading tax bias towards debt. Broadly speaking, there are two ways
to help neutralize this bias. One is to make debt less attractive; the
alternative is to make equity more attractive.279 Most obviously, debt
could be made less attractive by abolishing corporate deductions for
interest (i.e., taxing debt at both the corporate and the investor level),280
but the tax literature also suggests several more nuanced methods of
neutralizing bias toward debt. One such method is the implementation
of a comprehensive business income tax (“CBIT”) that eliminates the
deductibility of debt at the corporate level, but provides for no taxation
of either debt or equity at the investor level.281 Another such proposal is
for the introduction of “thin capitalization” rules, whereby progressive
limits are put on the amount of interest that can be deducted by
corporations in certain circumstances.282 In the banking context, several
authors have suggested reducing the availability of interest deductibility
276. Fundamental change in tax structures may provoke instability and financial
distress. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 16. However, the hope is that the
introduction of the more limited reform proposed in this Article would not prove
destabilizing.
277. “Gaps between announcement and implementation (or even the expectation of
tax changes) can distort financial decisions.” Id. at 32. For example, if a nation agreed
to implement an ACET1, the banks there might be reluctant to raise capital in the
interim period between the announcement and the implementation of the policy. A
transitional plan should be formulated to minimize undercapitalization during such
interim period.
278. Shaviro, supra note 264, at 7. In the United States, the relevant provisions are
26 I.R.C. §§ 163, 311(a) (2006).
279. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 13–14; RUUD A. DE MOOIJ, INT’L
MONETARY FUND, TAX BIASES TO DEBT FINANCE: ASSESSING THE PROBLEM, FINDING
SOLUTIONS 14 (2011), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/
sdn1111.pdf.
280. Edgar, supra note 105, at 1003.
281. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 264, at 8; INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11,
at 13; DE MOOIJ, supra note 279, at 15.
282. Shaviro, supra note 264, at 11; INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 13;
DE MOOIJ, supra note 279, at 14.
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as a bank’s leverage increases:283 for example, Fleischer has suggested
the “elimin[ation of] the deduction of interest by financial institutions to
the extent the debt/equity ratio of the institution exceeds 2 to 1.”284
The alternative to penalizing debt is to seek to neutralize debt bias
by incentivizing equity: proposals of this type can be targeted at either
the corporate or the shareholder level. For example, a dividend
exemption scheme exempts shareholders from paying tax on dividends
while the corporation continues to be liable for taxes on its equity.285
However, this does not respond completely to existing debt bias (which
exempts debt at the corporate level, rather than at the investor level), so
a dividend imputation scheme might be more appropriate—this would
give shareholders a credit for tax paid on equity at the corporate level so
that equity is effectively taxed at the shareholder level, matching debt
taxation.286 Alternatively, an Allowance for Corporate Equity (“ACE”)
allows for a deduction on equity at the corporate level that approximates
corporate deductibility of interest.287
The following (highly stylized) examples illustrate the differences
between these proposals. 288 Assume that in Country X, corporate
income (including income that is distributed to shareholders by means of
dividends) is taxable at a rate of 20%, but interest payments made to
service corporate debt are tax deductible. Individual investors’ income
is taxed at a rate of 30%, notwithstanding the source of that income.
The following scenarios show how tax reform would impact Company
C and Investor I, who are resident in Country X.
Scenario 1: Abolishing Corporate Deductions for Interest
Company C’s income would be taxable at a rate of 20%: it is
irrelevant whether that income is contributed to shareholders as
283.
284.

See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 264, at 11; Fleischer, supra note 14, at 4.
Fleischer, supra note 14, at 4. Fleischer further notes, “[t]he goal of such a tax
is not to punish banks, but rather to remove the tax incentive to increase leverage
beyond the ratio that would arise in a world without taxes.” Id. at 4.
285. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 264, at 7.
286. See, e.g., id. at 7–8.
287. See, e.g., id. at 9; INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 14; DE MOOIJ,
supra note 279, at 16–19.
288. These examples are highly simplified, ignoring that many countries have
progressive tax rates and treat investor income differently depending on its source. The
examples also ignore that if reform were implemented, rates would most likely be
adjusted as part of the reform to neutralize the revenue impact of the change.
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dividends or used to service debt obligations. Investor I would pay 30%
on all income: it is irrelevant whether that income derives from an
investment in equity or debt.
Scenario 2: Introduction of CBIT
Company C’s income would be taxable at a rate of 20%: it is
irrelevant whether that income is contributed to shareholders as
dividends or used to service debt obligations. Investor I would not pay
any tax on income from its investments in equity or debt.
Scenario 3: Introduction of Thin Capitalization Rules
Company C’s income would be taxable at a rate of 20%. To the
extent that Company C maintained a ratio of debt to equity below a
certain level, income used to service debt obligations would be tax
deductible. Once the ratio of Company C’s debt to equity exceeded the
stipulated level, this tax deductibility would be progressively eliminated.
Investor I would pay 30% on all income: it is irrelevant whether that
income derives from an investment in equity or debt.
Scenario 4: Introduction of Dividend Exemption Scheme
Company C’s income would be taxable at a rate of 20%, but
income used to service debt obligations would be tax deductible.
Investor I would not pay any tax on income from its investments in
equity, but would pay 30% on income from their investments in debt.
Scenario 5: Introduction of Dividend Imputation Scheme
Company C’s income would be taxable at a rate of 20%, but
income used to service debt obligations would be tax deductible.
Investor I would receive a credit for the tax already paid by Company C,
and so would pay only 10% on income from its investments in equity.
Investor I would continue to pay 30% on income from their investments
in debt.
Scenario 6: Introduction of ACE
Company C’s income would be tax deductible if it is either used to
service debt obligations or contributed to shareholders as dividends.
Investor I would pay 30% on income from its investments in both equity
and debt.
The remainder of this Part will consider the desirability and
feasibility of narrowly applying the foregoing proposals for the targeted
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purpose of addressing banks’ incentives to arbitrage regulatory capital
requirements.
The simplest way to discourage banks from using hybrid
instruments to satisfy regulatory capital requirements would be to end
tax-deductibility for such hybrids, effectively saying that all regulatory
capital must be taxed at the same rate as Common Equity Tier 1.
However, even assuming that the political difficulties inherent in
effecting such a change could be overcome,289 this would raise the cost
of regulatory capital for banks and thus intensify the already strong
incentives that banks have to understate their risk-weighted assets (the
denominator of the regulatory capital ratio) in order to hold less
capital.290 The same concerns arise in the context of thin capitalization
rules: assume, for example, that a rule was introduced that provided that
the tax-deductibility of a bank’s hybrid instruments would be
progressively eliminated as the ratio of the bank’s hybrid instruments to
Common Equity Tier 1 increased. This would succeed in making
hybrids less attractive to banks, but it would also make regulatory
capital more expensive. This type of thin capitalization rule would thus
exacerbate incentives to arbitrage the calculation of risk-weighted
assets, and the more complicated nature of progressive thin
capitalization rules (as opposed to a more clear-cut abolition of taxdeductibility for hybrids) would allow greater scope for exploitation.291
The remaining proposals for neutralizing debt bias are less likely to
encourage banks to underreport their risk-weighted assets. However,
three of these (the CBIT, dividend imputation, and dividend exemption
schemes) are non-starters because of the size and importance of taxexempt and foreign investors as a market for bank capital.292 Looking

289. Eisenger colorfully describes the resistance that would accompany any attempt
to abolish corporate debt deductibility generally, noting that “[r]educing the
deductibility would be elegant but generate screams of bloody murder from corporate
America.” Jesse Eisinger, Distortion in Tax Code Makes Debt More Attractive to
Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/distortionin-tax-code-makes-debt-more-attractive-to-banks/?ref=business.
290. Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 2.
291. Complicated tax rules allow greater scope for arbitrage activity. See Fleischer,
supra note 14, at 5.
292. The IMF has estimated that tax-exempt investors hold 40%, and non-residents
hold 30% of all equity issued in the United Kingdom. For the United States, the IMF
suggests that approximately 50% of equities are held by tax-exempt investors. INT’L
MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 8.

2013]

BANK INCENTIVES AND TAXATION

873

first at the CBIT, we could tailor this for regulatory capital purposes by
charging banks a tax on any hybrid instrument used to satisfy regulatory
capital requirements: the rate of taxation would be equal to the amount
the bank is charged on its Common Equity Tier 1. Then, because CBIT
requires no tax payment at the investor level,293 tax credits would need
to be given at the investor level for the compensatory tax paid by the
bank on its hybrid instruments, as well as the tax paid by the bank on its
Common Equity Tier 1. However, tax-exempt and foreign investors
would not be able to take advantage of these investor-level tax credits,
and so a CBIT scheme would give them no greater incentive to invest in
Common Equity Tier 1. Furthermore, these investors would start to
charge more for hybrid capital; while they would continue to pay no tax
themselves, they would be forced to absorb corporate-level tax on
hybrids for the first time. 294 Thus, as far as tax-exempt and foreign
investors are concerned, there would be no difference between a CBIT
scheme like this, and a scheme that merely ended tax-deductibility of
hybrid instruments.
If we were to design a dividend imputation scheme for Common
Equity Tier 1, then both the bank and its shareholders would still pay
taxes on the capital, but shareholders would be given a credit for the tax
already paid by the bank.295 If all bank shareholders were in a position
to take advantage of these tax credits, then the scheme would ensure that
equity would only be taxed at the rate that applies to investors, just as
with hybrid instruments.296 However, tax-exempt and foreign investors
cannot use these tax credits, and so they would still absorb corporatelevel tax on Common Equity Tier 1 while not being required to bear any
corporate-level tax on hybrids: the tax bias would persist for these
investors.297

293. Shaviro, supra note 264, at 8; INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 13; DE
MOOIJ, supra note 279, at 15.
294. Edgar, supra note 105, at 1003.
295. The purpose of structuring the dividend imputation scheme in this way is to
ensure the total tax collected on equity approximates what would have been collected if
only the shareholder had been taxed. Shaviro gives a helpful example that illustrates
how a dividend imputation scheme works: “[S]uppose the corporate rate was 25
percent, the shareholder rate was 35 percent, and that a given shareholder received a €
75 dividend (€ 100 with the gross-up). For tax purposes, the shareholder would have €
100 of income and a € 25 tax credit, and therefore would owe a further € 10 of tax.”
Shaviro, supra note 264, at 7.
296. Edgar, supra note 105, at 1004.
297. Id. at 1005, 1010–11.
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Finally, a dividend exemption scheme would render return on
Common Equity Tier 1 taxable at the bank level but not at the investor
level, whereas the return on hybrids would be the opposite: taxable at
the investor level but not at the bank level. While exempting dividends
from tax would be attractive for local investors, tax-exempt and foreign
investors never paid any tax on dividends in the first place. A dividend
exemption scheme would therefore not mark any change from the status
quo for these investors: just as before, no corporate-level tax would be
factored into the interest payments that these investors receive, but
corporate-level tax would be factored into dividend payments. 298
Therefore, all other things being equal, tax-exempt and foreign investors
would still charge less for hybrids than for Common Equity Tier 1.
In sum, to the extent that banks are raising capital from the large
and important tax-exempt and foreign investor bloc, no CBIT, dividend
imputation, or dividend exemption scheme would reorient existing bank
incentives to satisfy regulatory capital requirements with hybrid
instruments. The efficacy of an Allowance for Common Equity Tier 1,
or “ACET1,” however, is not undermined by the prominence of taxexempt or foreign investors in the capital markets. An ACET1 would
allow for a bank-level deduction on Common Equity Tier 1 expense,299
which would lower the bank’s cost of equity; this lower cost would then
be passed on to all investors (including tax-exempt and foreign
investors), rendering Common Equity Tier 1 a much more attractive
funding source for banks. Furthermore, because the ACET1 ensures
that Common Equity Tier 1 and debt funding are taxed in the same way,
it reduces incentives for banks to understate their risk-weighted assets
and deliberately hold insufficient capital.
As such, the ACET1 is a relatively simple and elegant alternative to
accommodating hybrids within the regulatory capital framework.
However, the introduction of this ACET1 does not obviate the need for
regulatory capital requirements: the persistence of government subsidies
for debt still provides some incentive for banks to be overly298.
Tax-exempt investors — pension funds, charitable foundations and, in many cases,
sovereign wealth funds—clearly prefer debt finance: for them indeed there is a clear
arbitrage gain in lending to tax-paying corporations and taking the interest untaxed. In
addition, for non-resident investors, not liable to domestic personal taxes, the
deductibility of debt finance is critical.

INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 8.
299. Shaviro, supra note 264, at 9; INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 14.
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leveraged, 300 and these incentives still need to be addressed by
regulation. Furthermore, even with the best incentives in place, banks
suffering from distress may not be able to maintain sufficient Common
Equity Tier 1. In this context, regulatory capital requirements serve as a
supervisory tool; a bank’s inability to comply with capital regulations
sends a warning signal to regulators about the bank’s health. 301 The
following Part therefore explores in more detail how the ACET1 can be
accommodated within the regulatory capital framework.
IV. AN ALLOWANCE FOR COMMON EQUITY REGULATORY CAPITAL
An ACE has already been implemented more broadly (i.e., for all
corporate equity) in several countries, including Belgium. 302 The
Belgian ACE model serves as a useful starting point for formulating the
more limited ACET1 (which would only be available to banks).
Belgium allows for a deduction to the value of equity, and this
allowance “applies to the book value of net equity and is corrected for
the net value of equity participations.”303 Because an ACET1 structured
in this way would allow for a deduction for retained earnings (as well as
dividends paid), it would match tax provisions that allow deductions for
debt payments as they accrue, even if they are not paid at that time. It
would therefore avoid any unintended consequence of encouraging
banks to distribute their profits to shareholders, rather than build up
cushions of retained earnings. Furthermore, because the ACET1 would
only be available on net equity less equity participations, banks would
not be able to use the allowance twice on the same funds.304
The Belgian model, like most proposals for an ACE, 305 only
provides an allowance for the notional return on equity (as calculated by
reference to some benchmark rate—Belgium uses “a notional deduction

300.
301.

See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.
This is the rationale for the United States’ “prompt corrective action” regime,
codified in 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (2006).
302. “Croatia implemented an ACE from 1994 to 2001, and it has recently been
adopted in Belgium and Latvia. A variant is applied in Brazil, and partial ACEs were
applied in Austria and Italy.” INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 11, at 14.
303. DE MOOIJ, supra note 279, at 17.
304. “If the parent would be granted an ACE on all equity, including that used to
finance participations in related entities, it would receive an allowance for returns that
are untaxed.” DE MOOIJ, supra note 279, at 17 n.18.
305. Id. at 16–17.
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to the value of equity at the rate on 10-year government bonds”).306 In
contrast, tax-deductibility is available with respect to all interest
expenses (even when the rates of interest exceed market rates). 307
Therefore, if an ACET1 were implemented, and it only allowed for the
deduction of notional rates of return on that equity, debt bias would
persist to the extent that a bank delivered a return on equity in excess of
the notional return.308 In such situations, leverage would still be a more
attractive way of funding bank investments, and increased leverage
would likely drive up return on Common Equity Tier 1 (at least during
good times),309 which would make an even higher portion of return on
such equity not tax-deductible, making leverage seem even more
attractive. This vicious cycle would encourage banks to become highlyleveraged, defeating the intention of an ACET1.
It is conceivable, though, that an ACET1 could be applied to the
full return on Common Equity Tier 1, thus fully neutralizing the tax bias
for debt and against equity. 310 The chief objection to designing an
ACET1 in this way (and indeed, the main reservation associated with
implementing ACEs in general, even when based on notional returns) is
that doing so will result in a loss of revenue for the taxing authority.311
Currently, taxing authorities receive taxation income levied on the full
return on equity; if an ACET1 were applied to a notional return on

306.
307.
308.

Id. at 17.
Id.
This is the likely, rather than a purely theoretical, outcome. For example, as of
June 30, 2012, the yield on 10-year U.S. treasury bonds (the most obvious candidate for
the “notional return” on equity for United States banks) was 1.67%. Resource Center:
Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/pages/TextView.aspx?data=yieldYear
&year=2012 (last visited June 16, 2013). On June 30, 2012, the return on equity was
9.99% for JPMorgan, 5.89% for Citigroup, and 12.98% for Wells Fargo. See JPMorgan
Chase Return on Equity, YCHARTS, http://ycharts.com/companies/JPM/return_on_
equity (last visited Aug. 5, 2013); Citigroup Return on Equity, YCHARTS,
http://ycharts.com/companies/C/return_on_equity (last visited Aug. 5, 2013); Wells
Fargo Return on Equity, YCHARTS, http://ycharts.com/companies/WFC/return_on_
equity (last visited Aug. 5, 2013).
309. Admati et al., supra note 18, at 16.
310. Allowing banks to deduct the full return on all common equity held as
regulatory capital goes beyond the IMF’s proposal, which is to “giv[e banks] a tax
deduction for a notional return on Tier 1 capital.” INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note
11, at 14 (emphasis added).
311. DE MOOIJ, supra note 279, at 3.
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banks’ Common Equity Tier 1, then taxing authorities would lose
revenue in an amount equal to taxes that are currently levied on that
notional return. 312 To fully neutralize debt bias by allowing banks
complete deductibility of return on Common Equity Tier 1 would result
in even greater losses in taxation revenue (although the revenue impact
could potentially be offset by the introduction of some type of financial
institution or transaction tax).313 While it might be expected that some
of this revenue could be recouped at the investor level (i.e., investors
receive dividends tax-free from banks, but must then pay tax on the
dividends they receive), to the extent that shareholders are tax-exempt or
are located in another jurisdiction, there will be no recoupment from
investors of the foregone bank-level tax revenue.314
In order to determine the feasibility of an ACET1 that allows
complete deductibility of return on common equity regulatory capital,
models would need to be run to determine what the actual impact of
such a move would be on the GDP of each country.315 This is a project
for future research, though one design issue to be tackled is whether the
ACET1 should be available to banks only with respect to the minimum
required holdings of Common Equity Tier 1, or whether it should be
available for larger holdings as well. The former option would certainly
limit the revenue implications of implementing an ACET1 for banks,
because it would ensure that only a limited slice of bank funding was
exempt from taxation. However, given that we want to encourage banks
to fund themselves with more Common Equity Tier 1 than the minimum
requirements dictate, it would be prudent (if economically feasible) to
extend the ACET1 to a “buffer” of Common Equity Tier 1 beyond the
minimum amount required.316 Thinking more broadly, calculations of
312. The IMF has developed models to allow it to estimate the impact on GDP of
the introduction of an ACE for the notional return on all common and preferred stock
(the 10-year government bond yield in each country) for all corporations (i.e., not just
banks). Id. at 20. The IMF estimates that this would likely result in a reduction in
revenue of 0.43% of GDP in the United States, and 0.56% of GDP in the United
Kingdom. Id. Complete deductibility of return on equity for all corporations would
obviously have a larger impact on GDP. However, the effect on GDP of an ACET1 is
unknown at present.
313. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
314. See Edgar, supra note 105, at 1002–03.
315. If the proposed ACET1 is not economically feasible, it might still be worth
investigating the benefits of allowing deductibility of a notional return on bank equity.
316. There are likely to be few detrimental consequences to society from banks
funding themselves with more equity than originally intended. Admati et al., supra note
84, at 33.
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revenue impact should be based on the amount of Common Equity Tier
1 currently required by Basel III, but it would also be worthwhile to run
numbers to determine the impact of an ACET1 if banks were required to
fund themselves with more Common Equity Tier 1 than Basel III
currently requires. While this Article does not purport to make any
comment about the quantitative aspects of Basel III, there are many
economists who believe that in order to shore up the banking system,
there needs to be a significant increase in the amount of Common Equity
Tier 1 used by banks, above and beyond what is currently required by
Basel III. 317 If it is decided that regulatory capital requirements for
banks should be increased, that increase could be introduced in
conjunction with an ACET1 (again, if economically feasible), thus
softening the impact of such increase on banks.
The foregoing discussion is very high level and neglects many of
the detailed design features that will need to be worked out before an
ACET1 can be implemented, or even properly evaluated. Economists
and tax scholars will surely have much to contribute to this endeavor.
From a regulatory scholarship perspective, we need to consider whether
there is a sound policy basis for according special favorable tax
treatment to banks, and whether consistent international implementation
of such an ACET1 is feasible.
A. POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING AN ALLOWANCE FOR
COMMON EQUITY REGULATORY CAPITAL
The proposed ACET1 is a type of tax credit that will operate as a
subsidy only for banks. Such a subsidy is likely to meet with some
popular resistance, given the current level of anti-bank sentiment around
the world.318 However, because of collective action problems, it can be
difficult for broad community disapproval to have any impact on the
317. For example, Admati and nineteen other prominent economists have argued
that banks should be required to fund themselves with common equity in an amount
equal to at least 15% of their total assets. See Admati et al., supra note 11.
318. This sentiment is perhaps best epitomized by the Occupy Wall Street
movement, which describes itself as “fighting back against the corrosive power of
major banks and multinational corporations over the democratic process, and the role of
Wall Street in creating an economic collapse that has caused the greatest recession in
generations.” About, OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallst.org/about/ (last visited
June 16, 2013). Despite the ubiquity and high visibility of the Occupy Wall Street
movement, however, it has achieved little in terms of tangible results.
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formulation of financial regulation, especially on an issue as complex as
capital regulation. 319 Instead, in the United States at least, it is the
financial industry itself that has more input in the development of
financial regulation.320 This means that financial regulation is an uphill
battle,321 and some of the more drastic reforms that have been proposed
to improve financial stability, such as breaking up the big banks,
financial transaction taxes, and taxes on leverage, will likely face
insurmountable industry opposition. 322 The ACET1 proposed in this
Article is unique among such reforms in that it seeks to improve
financial stability by benefitting banks, and, as such, is a policy that is
likely to be encouraged by the financial industry.323
The proposed ACET1 is thus a politically expedient way to remove
a key incentive for unhealthy levels of bank leverage. An ACET1 is a
defensible policy as well as politically expedient; it can be justified by
the “specialness” of banks. Banks are special because they are a key
source of credit and thus fuel broader economic growth.324 In order to
provide that credit, banks must often perform a maturity transformation
role: the credit that banks usually provide is longer-term credit, whereas
the funding they rely on to make the longer-term credit available is
comprised of deposits and other short-term funding (like repurchase
agreements) which can be withdrawn from the bank very quickly. 325
The inherent fragility, but social necessity, of this banking business

319. For a discussion of the collective action problems associated with influencing
financial regulatory policy, see Allen, supra note 14, at 26–29.
320. As Senator Dick Durbin put it, “the banks . . . are still the most powerful lobby
on Capitol Hill. And they frankly own the place.” Ryan Grimm, Dick Durbin: Banks
“Frankly Own the Place”, HUFFINGTON POST (May 30, 2009, 6:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/29/dick-durbin-banks-frankly_n_193010.html.
321. In terms of capital regulation, Singer notes that “[h]istorically, financial
institutions have generally resisted the imposition of capital regulation . . . .” SINGER,
supra note 41, at 19.
322. For a discussion of resistance to the implementation of international financial
taxes in the wake of the Financial Crisis, see Richard T. Page, Foolish Revenge or
Shrewd Regulation: Financial-Industry Tax Law Reforms Proposed in the Wake of the
Financial Crisis, 85 TUL. L. REV. 191, 207 (2010).
323. In a similar vein, Jesse Eisenger notes that “[m]aking dividend payments tax
deductible, which would start to level the playing field, might be easier and more
popular.” Eisenger, supra note 289.
324. See generally FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, ARE BANKS SPECIAL?
(1982), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/ar1982a.cfm.
325. See id.
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model can be invoked to support a special tax subsidy for Common
Equity Tier 1 that will stabilize banks.326
Special treatment for banks is nothing new, in any event. Banks in
the United States have had recourse to the Federal Reserve as “lender of
last resort” since 1913,327 and since 1933, banks have had their deposit
liabilities insured by the FDIC.328 Outside of the United States, some
central banks have been performing “lender of last resort” roles for
centuries, 329 and deposit insurance is now available to depositors in
banks in over 100 countries.330 More recently, banks around the world
perceived as “too big to fail” have received implicit subsidies from their
home governments.331 Each of these types of special treatment, however,
has a negative side effect in that it creates moral hazard: it encourages
banks to engage in riskier behavior so as to multiply their profits in
good times, knowing that there is a government safety net that will
absorb the losses in bad times.332 Conversely, the ACET1 proposed in
326. Because all banks perform this maturity transformation role, this ACET1 can
justifiably be given to all banks, even those smaller banks that do not profit from
implicit “too big to fail” government subsidies. The ACET1 therefore might soothe
some of the concerns of mid-tier and community banks, which are currently
experiencing higher funding costs than those being charged to their “too big to fail”
brethren, and feel disproportionately burdened by the provisions in Dodd-Frank, many
of which were designed to address systemic stability issues that such banks feel they do
not contribute to. See The Effect of Dodd-Frank on Small Financial Institutions and
Small Businesses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of
the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 116 (2011) (prepared statement of James D.
MacPhee, Chairman, Independent Community Bankers of America).
327. The Federal Reserve System was established by the Federal Reserve Act of
1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913). Section 13 of that Act authorizes the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to act as a lender of last resort.
328. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was formed in 1933 with the
enactment of the Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
329. See, e.g., Humphrey, supra note 194, at 334–35 (noting that the Bank of
England has been identified as the “lender of last resort” since the early 1800s).
330. Deposit Insurance Systems Worldwide, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
DEPOSIT INSURERS, http://www.iadi.org/di.aspx?id=67 (last visited June 16, 2013).
331. See supra notes 103, 109–12 and accompanying text.
332. Moral hazard is the “tendency of an insured to relax his efforts to prevent the
occurrence of the risk that he has insured against because he has shifted the risk to an
insurance company.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 121 (5th ed.
1998). Lovett expressed the application of moral hazard in the banking context as
follows: “If governments and modern nations do not allow most banks to [fail], how
can the leaders and managements of banking institutions be disciplined and avoid
unduly risky, negligent, or adventurous lending policies (or simply poor asset-liability

2013]

BANK INCENTIVES AND TAXATION

881

this Article promotes less risky behavior by neutralizing in large part the
existing incentives for banks to minimize their equity funding.
The ACET1 would, of course, be an expense for taxing authorities
because it would reduce the revenue they would otherwise receive from
taxing bank equity. Such an expense must be considered, however, in
the context of the cost of financial instability. History has shown that
tax revenues are likely to drop sharply in a recession (or depression)
following a financial crisis, leading to an explosion of government
debt.333 For example, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated
that the United States incurred an additional $7 trillion in government
debt as a direct result of the recession following the financial crisis.334
Given the magnitude of the cost of instability, foregoing tax revenue
from bank equity may well be an acceptable “premium” for improved
stability (and if a future financial crisis were to occur nonetheless, the
government would already have a reduced expectation of revenues from
financial sector taxation, so the impact of such crisis on government
debt would be somewhat dampened). As an added benefit, to the extent
that the ACET1 causes governments to be less dependent on tax
revenues from banks in the first place, the political clout of banks may
be somewhat weakened. On the margins, there would also be some
administrative savings associated with dispensing with hybrid
instruments as regulatory capital: neither regulatory nor tax authorities
would need to devote resources to evaluating new types of hybrid
instruments to determine whether they should qualify as regulatory
capital, or be entitled to debt tax treatment, respectively.335 Furthermore,
to the extent that the ACET1 reduces incentives for banks to manipulate
their accounting for risk-weighted assets, regulators will have an easier
management)?” William A. Lovett, Moral Hazard, Bank Supervision and Risk-Based
Capital Requirements, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1365, 1365 (1989).
333. CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 142 (2009).
334. Simon Johnson, Where is the Volcker Rule?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2011,
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/where-is-the-volcker-rule/
?ref=business. The economic contractions that follow a financial crisis often impose
high costs on society in the form of reduced tax revenues. These costs are likely to
dwarf the costs of any bailout in a financial crisis. REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note
333, at 142, 224.
335. In addition, the social waste associated with private sector development of
hybrid instruments to arbitrage regulatory capital requirements would be avoided:
“Tens of millions of dollars a year in billable hours and investment banking fees are
devoted to analyzing whether particular financial products will or should be treated as
debt or equity for tax purposes.” Fleischer, supra note 14, at 10.
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job monitoring banks’ compliance with regulatory capital
requirements.336
It should also be noted that several commentators have identified a
significant flaw in the Basel architecture: namely, that regulatory capital
requirements can be destabilizing to the extent that they encourage
banks to invest heavily in asset classes that have been assigned low riskweightings. 337 This practice simultaneously increases the number of
such assets in the system and correlates bank exposure to them, and
there is a very real concern that such growth/correlation will make the
assets themselves more risky and the banking system as a whole more
susceptible to bubbles and panics.338 However, the implementation of
the proposed ACET1 will mitigate incentives for such destabilizing
herding by banks: to the extent that the ACET1 lessens bank incentives
to arbitrage regulatory capital requirements, banks will be less likely to
concentrate their investments in low risk-weighted asset classes.
Finally, it is important to recognize that traditional banks are not
the only institutions that provide long-term credit funded by short-term
liabilities. The term “shadow banking” is often used to describe
institutions (for example, money market mutual funds) that carry out
similar functions as banks but are not subject to banking regulation.339
While many have argued that the shadow banking sector poses great risk
to financial stability,340 Basel III (and its predecessors Basel I and II)
have never been applied to this shadow banking sector. Indeed, the
growth of the shadow banking industry was in many ways a response to

336. The ACET1 addresses some of the concerns about regulatory capacity raised
by Calomiris & Herring, supra note 63, at 5.
337. This was the case with mortgage-backed securities issued prior to the Financial
Crisis. See Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial
Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture 20–22 (Yale Law &
Econ., Research Paper No. 452, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2127749;
see also Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions, Unintended
Consequences, and Lessons for Emerging Markets 13 (ADBI Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 392, 2012), available at http://www.adbi.org/working-paper/2012/10/29/
5292.dodd.frank.act.basel.iii.emerging.markets/.
338. Acharya, supra note 337, at 13.
339. Gorton & Metrick, supra note 220, at 261–62.
340. See generally id.; Eric F. Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and Its Legal
Origins (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1990816.
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capital requirements for traditional banks:341 many investors migrated to
institutions that were not subject to capital requirements, and therefore
were perceived as able to offer investors more of a return.342 Because
bank regulatory capital requirements do not apply to this shadow
banking sector, the ACET1 proposed in this Article would not be
available to shadow banks either. This might have a salutary side-effect:
the institution of the ACET1 would give traditional banks an edge over
their less-regulated competitors, which might start to reverse the
migration of funds to the shadow banking sector.
B. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION
The BCBS promulgated Basel I, its first international standards for
regulating bank capital, in 1988.343 These standards were the response
to a growing consensus that regulatory capital requirements were
desirable but expensive, and that unilateral action by a country in setting
minimum regulatory capital requirements would increase stability, but
lead to a loss of competitiveness in attracting banking business. 344
Individual countries were therefore reluctant to implement minimum
capital standards for their banks unless they could be sure that other
banks would be required to play by the same rules: international
harmonization was a prerequisite to the implementation of stringent
regulatory capital requirements. 345 In contrast, because the proposed
ACET1 would benefit banks rather than hinder them, national
governments could move unilaterally in implementing such an ACET1.
341. In 1981, the United States implemented regulatory capital requirements for
banks for the first time, which incentivized some investors to exit the traditional
banking industry. See id. at 274. The rapid rise of the shadow banking industry began
in the early 1980s, and shadow banking actually overtook the traditional banking sector
in terms of market share mid-way through 2007. TOBIAS ADRIAN & HYUN SONG SHIN,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS, THE SHADOW BANKING
SYSTEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION 1–2 (2009), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr382.pdf.
342. “Where competition from unregulated entities is permitted, whether explicitly
or de facto, capital and other requirements imposed on regulated firms may shrink
margins enough to make them unattractive to investors. The result, as in the past, will
be some combination of regulatory arbitrage, assumption of higher risk in permitted
activities, and exit from the industry.” Gorton & Metrick, supra note 220, at 305.
343. BASEL I, supra note 8.
344. For a detailed discussion of incentives for harmonization of capital regulation,
see SINGER, supra note 41, at 20–35.
345. Id. at 49.
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Indeed, it would make the country more attractive as a jurisdiction for
banking business. Thus, if even one country with a major banking
sector were to implement such an ACET1, it is quite possible that other
countries with substantial financial industries would quickly follow suit,
in order to avoid migration of their financial services businesses to the
nation that provides the ACET1.346 International implementation of an
ACET1 might therefore be brought about even without agreement on
international standards for an ACET1. Such standards are still desirable,
however, to ensure a level of consistency in the models used to
implement the ACET1 around the world.347
In the absence of any international tax law organization or standard
setter,348 there is little by way of an international tax forum to agree on a
model ACET1. International tax law is largely comprised of bilateral
treaties, 349 whereas international financial law is populated by
multilateral technocratic rules and standards, 350 and the BCBS in
particular has a successful history of developing international standards
that have been widely implemented at the national level.351 While the
BCBS has traditionally eschewed any responsibility towards addressing
tax issues (in Basel I, it noted that “[c]onvergence in tax regimes, though

346. The imperative of regulatory competitiveness is often used to justify countries
adopting more lax financial regulation – this is often referred to as a “race to the
bottom.” Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How it
Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 268 (2011). Here, however, the desire for competitiveness
would encourage larger holdings of common equity, inspiring a “race to the top.”
347. “The internationalization of financial markets creates the need for greater
coordination and cooperation among financial regulators.” Eric C. Chaffee, The DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: A Failed Vision for
Increasing Consumer Protection and Heightening Corporate Responsibility in
International Financial Transactions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1449 (2011).
348. Some academics have proposed that an international tax law authority should
be created, but none exists at this time. See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, International Trade
and Tax Agreements May Be Coordinated, But Not Reconciled, 25 VA. TAX REV. 251,
254 (2005).
349. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57 TAX L. REV.
483, 497 (2004).
350. Brummer, supra note 346, at 260.
351. “[I]nternational coordination has been easier to achieve on the regulatory side
(as with the widespread adoption of Basel standards) than in relation to taxation.”
Michael Keen, The Taxation and Regulation of Banks 6 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working
Paper No. 11/206, 2011), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011
/wp11206.pdf.
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desirable, lies outside the competence of the Committee”),352 the BCBS
is not beholden to any formal organizational documents that prohibit it
from incorporating tax elements into its standards.353 It is therefore open
to the BCBS to incorporate a regulatory capital-focused model ACET1
into its standards on capital adequacy.
Of course, while the lack of formal boundaries on the BCBS’s
authority gives it flexibility, it also undermines the BCBS’s legitimacy
as a standard-setting body.354 The legitimacy of the BCBS has also been
questioned because it is an unelected and unrepresentative body,355 and
because its standards are often implemented by national-level
administrative law agencies without being subject to real oversight by
democratically elected institutions. 356 To date, these critiques of the
BCBS’ legitimacy have been largely theoretical, but if the BCBS were
to promulgate an international standard which required an ACET1 (and
thus deprived nation states of revenue in terms of the tax that would
otherwise be charged on Common Equity Tier 1), challenges to the
BCBS’ authority would likely be more than just academic. In the
United States, Congress jealously guards its oversight over taxation
authority, using legislation to override international tax treaties much
more frequently than it attempts to override other types of treaties.357 In
this context, it is unlikely that democratically elected legislatures would
acquiesce in technocratic agencies effecting the ACET1 by way of
administrative rule-makings. The ACET1 would have to be
implemented by way of legislation.
For that reason, it would be best for the BCBS to develop a model
for an ACET1, but make that model optional. In that way, the BCBS
352.
353.

BASEL I, supra note 8, at 3.
“The Committee does not possess any formal supranational supervisory
authority. Its conclusions do not have, and were never intended to have, legal force.”
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND ITS
MEMBERSHIP (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf.
354. Brummer notes that “some international financial organizations, like the Bank
for International Settlements [of which the BCBS is part], have no clear responsibilities
to any public. The attenuated proximity to core democratic processes is problematic for
some observers.” CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM:
RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 188 (2012).
355. Id. at 188–89, 208. Only twenty-seven countries are represented in the BCBS.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 7, at 1.
356. Many less contentious international financial standards can avoid the political
process entirely, being implemented at the administrative level without any need for
formal ratification. BRUMMER, supra note 354, at 188.
357. Avi-Yonah, supra note 349, at 493–99.
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could strive to achieve consistency without compulsion. As discussed
above, the threat of international competition could provide the
necessary compulsion for broad implementation of the ACET1: if one
country adopts a BCBS-model ACET1, others are likely to follow suit
so as not to lose their competitiveness as a forum for financial services
business.358 In countries where the banking sector makes up a larger
proportion of GDP, 359 one could reasonably expect that the revenue
implications of the proposed ACET1 would be felt more keenly than in
a country with a less dominant financial sector, and that this may lead to
some resistance to the implementation of such an ACET1. But these
countries also have a greater need for financial sector competitiveness
than do countries with more diversified economies, and more to lose in
the event of a financial crisis. As such, they should have more incentive
to adopt reforms that encourage better-capitalized banks and thus
promote financial stability.
CONCLUSION
Hybrid debt-equity instruments increase the complexity and
compromise the stability of the financial system: they are “complex,
confusing to many investors, and would not exist in a world without a
debt/equity tax distortion.” 360 As such, hybrids are a clumsy
reconciliation of conflicting tax policies that favor debt and regulatory
policies that discourage debt. In contrast, an ACET1 that allows banks
to deduct the cost of their Common Equity Tier 1 seems to be a much
more elegant and appealing way of resolving the tax/regulatory
conundrum. Not only would such an ACET1 neutralize incentives for
358.
359.

See supra notes 346–47 and accompanying text.
The UK is an example of a country whose financial sector makes up a
relatively large percentage of its GDP. See Stephen Burgess, Measuring Financial
Sector Output and Its Contribution to UK GDP, BANK OF ENGLAND Q. BULL. 234
(2011), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/
quarterlybulletin/qb110304.pdf. In a recent report, the UK’s Independent Commission
on Banking concluded that the UK had to implement financial reform over and above
that being required by international bodies like the BCBS, because of “the position of
the UK as an open economy with very large banks extensively engaged in global
wholesale and investment banking alongside UK retail banking. Indeed part of the
challenge for reform is to reconcile the UK’s position as an international financial
center with stable banking in the UK.” INDEPENDENT COMM. ON BANKING, supra note
73, at 7.
360. Fleischer, supra note 15, at 31.
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banks to develop hybrid debt-equity instruments, it would also
significantly reduce incentives for banks to manipulate reporting of their
risk-weighted assets, with the ancillary benefits of reducing regulators’
costs, reducing correlation risk, and reversing the migration of funds to
the shadow banking system. Furthermore, the ACET1 is appealing from
a realpolitik perspective, because while banks ordinarily resist financial
regulatory reform, they would likely embrace the implementation of an
ACET1.
Without the implementation of this ACET1, the BCBS and national
authorities will perennially find themselves in the unfortunate position
of having to evaluate new generations of hybrid instruments that have
been designed to game regulatory capital requirements and tax laws.
Despite the best efforts of regulators to predict how these hybrids will
operate, many of the problems inherent in these instruments will not
come to light until they backfire in the next financial crisis.

